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PRODUCT LIABILITY IN MARYLAND: TRADITIONAL 
AND EMERGING THEORIES OF RECOVERY 
AND DEFENSE 
EdwardS. Digges, Jr.t 
John G. Billmyrett 
In recent years, product liability law in Maryland and 
across the country has placed greater responsibility on the manu-
facturers of products causing injury. In this article, the authors 
review the traditional theories of manufacturer liability and dis-
cuss the novel theories being advanced to expand that liability. 
Also considered are the defenses available to manufacturers, 
both traditional and emerging. The authors conclude with the 
prognosis that because the pendulum has swung so far in the 
direction of placing greater responsibility on manufacturers, fur-
ther expansion of manufacturer liability is both unlikely and 
inappropriate. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Product liability law has changed dramatically since this law review 
published a symposium on product liability a decade ago1 and a sequel 
article two years later.2 Active jurists and lawmakers, in response to 
rapid technological advances, have formulated new causes of action in 
order to hold manufacturers of products liable for product-related inju-
ries. An increasingly complex body of law has developed worthy of close 
examination and analysis. · 
This article begins with a discussion of the established theories of 
recovery under product liability law: strict liability, negligence, and war-
ranty. It then discusses several emerging theories of recovery such as 
alternative liability, concert of action, enterprise liability, market share 
liability, and the concept applied to "Saturday Night Specials" under 
which there is liability for nondefective products which the manufacturer 
has reason to know will be misused. The article then examines the estab-
lished defenses to product liability actions, including assumption of risk, 
misuse, alteration of product, and comparative fault. The article con-
cludes with a discussion of emerging defenses, such as the sophisticated 
user defense, the informed intermediary defense, and the state of the art 
defense. 
II. ESTABLISHED THEORIES OF RECOVERY 
Until the mid-1960's, product liability law was dominated by the 
"general rule ofnonliability."3 Under this rule, manufacturers were held 
1. Products Liability Law Symposium, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (1975). 
2. Digges, Jr., Product Liability in Maryland Revisited, 7 U. BALT. L. REv. 1 (1977). 
3. The "general rule of nonliability" developed in a circuitous manner. It seems rea-
sonable that a manufacturer would owe a duty of care to all people who may come 
into contact with his product, provided that the manufacturer knows that his prod-
uct will be dangerous unless carefully made. This might have been the foundation 
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liable for product-related injuries only if negligence or breach of war-
ranty could be shown. In the mid-1960's the general rule of nonliability 
was replaced by the doctrine of strict liability in tort, under which manu-
facturers could be held liable even without a showing of negligence or 
breach of warranty. The strict liability doctrine has facilitated signifi-
cantly plaintiff recovery in products cases. Under the doctrine, recovery 
is no longer dependent upon a showing of carelessness by the manufac-
turer, as required under negligence law, or upon a showing of contractual 
privity, as required under warranty law. With the emergence and rapid 
development of strict liability, less emphasis has been placed on the tradi-
tional negligence and warranty theories, although in practice these ap-
proaches continue to be important supplements to the strict liability 
doctrine . 
• 
A. Strict Liability 
Strict liability in tort was applied first by the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 4 In Greenman, the 
plaintiff was injured while using the wood lathe attachment to a power 
tool when a piece of wood he was shaving flew off the machine and 
struck him in the head. 5 Justice Traynor, writing for the court, stated 
that liability in product liability cases is not governed by the law of con-
tract warranties, but by the law of strict liability in tort.6 The purpose of 
strict liability, he explained, "is to ensure that the cost of injuries result-
ing from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such 
on which product liability would have been built were it not for the opinion in 
Winterbottom v. Wright, 10M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). In Winterbot-
tom, the court held that one who contracted with the Postmaster General to supply 
mail coaches and to keep them in repair could not be held liable to one who was 
injured when the coach proved defective. Jd. at 116, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405. This 
holding was most likely due to the flawed theory upon which the plaintiff sought 
recovery and not to any consideration of duty of care. The plaintiff in Winterbottom 
argued that he should be awarded damages because of the contractual relationship 
between the manufacturer and the Postmaster General. Id. at 109-10, 152 Eng. 
Rep. at 402-03. The court rejected this argument because the plaintiff was a stranger 
to the contract. /d. at 114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 404-05. The court concluded that the 
only safe rule was to limit recovery to parties to the contract. /d. at 115, 152 Eng. 
Rep. at 405. Had the plaintiff argued that damages should be awarded because a 
manufacturer has a duty of care to all people who may come into contact with his 
product, this landmark case might have been decided differently. In subsequent 
cases, however, courts disregarded the facts of Winterbottom and the limited scope 
of its holding and applied the case as authority for the proposition that manufactur-
ers could not be held liable for negligence in the making of goods except to immedi-
ate buyers or persons placed in charge of the property by the buyer. See Hartlove v. 
Fox, 79 Md. 514, 29 A. 601 (1894); see also State v. Garzell Plastics Indus., 152 F. 
Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1957) (Chief Judge Lederle applied Maryland law in a case 
dealing with the duty of care owed to a remote buyer, tracing the development 
forward from Winterbottom to its status as of 1957, at which point the Maryland 
decisions still were "not entirely clear."). /d. at 483. 
4. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). 
5. /d. at 59, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698. 
6. /d. at 63-64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. 
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products on the market rather than by injured persons who are powerless 
to protect themselves."7 To recover for a product-related injury, the 
court held that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove: ( 1) that the prod-
uct was being used in an intended manner when the injury occurred; (2) 
that the plaintiff was injured; (3) that the injury was the result of a defect 
in the product; (4) that the plaintiff was not aware of the defect; and (5) 
that the defect made the product unsafe for its intended use. 8 
Strict liability rapidly became the favored theory of recovery in 
product liability law because it eliminated the privity requirement of the 
traditional contractual warranty theory, as well as any showing of negli-
gence other than the product defect itself.9 Two years after Greenman, 
the doctrine of strict liability was adopted in section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. 10 Section 402A added the additional require-
ments that, for there to be liability, the product must be "unreasonably 
dangerous" as well as defective, and that the product "is expected to and 
does reach the consumer without substantial change in the condition in 
which it is sold."ll 
Despite the pivotal role of Greenman in creating both the strict lia-
bility theory and section 402A, the Supreme Court of California has re-
fused to strictly apply section 402A by rejecting the requirement that the 
7. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. 
8. Id. at 63-64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. The Greenman opinion was 
foreshadowed by Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, ISO P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) 
("[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed where it will most effectively 
reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the 
market."). Id. 
9. Commentators have suggested that strict liability in tort will continue to be the 
preeminent theory of recovery. One scholar who analyzed the development of prod-
uct liability has gone as far as to suggest that: "[w]hen applicable, product strict 
liability should absorb negligence liability in toto and no further negligence pleading 
and litigation should be permitted once it is determined that product strict liability 
applies." Little, Rationalization of The Law of Product Liability, 36 U. FLA. L. 
REv. 1, 35-36 (1984). Built into the author's suggestion is the assumption that the 
elements of this new form of strict liability would be at least as inclusive as those of 
negligence. Id. 
10. Section 402A provides: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is su~ject to liabil-
ity for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or 
consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale 
of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered 
into any contractual relation with the seller. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A(l), (2) (1965). 
II. Id. 
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product be "unreasonably dangerous" 12 and has relaxed several of the 
Greenman requirements for strict liability. In Luque v. McLean, 13 the 
court held that a plaintiff need not prove that he was unaware of the 
defect; instead, the burden is on the defendant to establish that the plain-
tiff had a culpable lack of awareness of the defect. 14 In Cronin v. J.B.E. 
Olson Corp., 15 the court held that a plaintiff does not have to prove that 
the product was unsafe for its intended use, but merely that it was unsafe 
for a reasonably foreseeable use. 16 
In Phipps v. General Motors Corp. ,'7 the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land adopted the strict liability formula set forth in section 402A for 
products liability cases. 18 In Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 19 the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland stated that to recover under a strict liability 
theory the Restatement and Maryland law require one to establish: (1) 
that there had been a sale of a product; (2) that the seller released the 
product from its possession or control in a defective condition; (3) that 
the product was in a defective condition that was unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer; (4) that the defective condition caused in-
jury; and (5) that the product was expected to reach, and in fact, it did 
reach the consumer without substantial change in its condition. 20 It 
seems unlikely that Maryland will relax the requirements for a strict lia-
bility claim in the manner that California courts have done. In Singleton 
v. International Harvester Co.,21 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland law, considered and rejected the 
change in the defect standard espoused in Barker.22 Thus, unlike Cali-
fornia, which has recast the strict liability cause of action to impose 
greater liability than originally considered appropriate under Greenman 
and the Restatement, Maryland has refined the Restatement provision 
into clearly delineated elements. 
1. "Sale of a Product" Requirement 
The "sale of a product" requirement for strict liability has generated 
considerable debate in several respects. First, courts have had to deter-
12. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 129, 501 P.2d 1153, 1159, 104 Cal. 
Rptr. 433, 439 (1972) (stating that the unreasonably dangerous requirement crept 
into California law by its inclusion in § 402A). 
13. 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972). 
14. /d. at 145-46, 501 P.2d at 1170, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 450. 
15. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). 
16. /d. at 126, 501 P.2d at 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 437. 
17. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). In Phipps, the court found General Motors 
Corporation could be held strictly liable for injuries arising from a defective acceler-
ator that became stuck without warning, causing the automobile to accelerate sud-
denly. /d. at 352-53, 363 A.2d at 963. 
18. Id. at 353, 363 A.2d at 963. 
19. 50 Md. App. 614, 440 A.2d 1085 (1982), ajf'd, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983). 
20. /d. at 620, 440 A.2d at 1089. 
21. 685 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1981). 
22. /d. at 114. 
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mine what constitutes a "sale" as opposed to a service. 23 Appellate 
courts that have addressed the sale requirement have almost unani-
mously refused to extend strict product liability to pure service transac-
tions,24 but have construed the term "sale" broadly to include any 
activity intended to lead to a sale. Strict liability has been applied to 
injuries arising from the demonstration of an airplane,25 the lease of a 
truck,26 the giving of a free sample to a prospective customer,27 and the 
furnishing of a free lacquer reducer after a paint sale. 28 
Second, courts have had to determine whether a particular good or 
substance is a product. The analysis is relatively simple when consider-
23. Four issues have been identified as arising out of the "sale of a product" require-
ment: (1) whether the injury is the result of a "product" or a "service" (as where a 
plumber installs a water heater and may be dealing in a product- the water heater, 
or a service - the installation of the heater); (2) whether the transaction involves a 
sale (as where a beauty salon furnishes a permanent wave solution or a hospital 
furnishes gowns and needles); (3) whether nonprofessional services should be 
treated as professional services in sales-services situations (as where an optometrist 
or hospital is involved as opposed to a beauty salon); and (4) whether the sales-
service distinction should be treated the same under strict tort liability as under 
cases premised on the Uniform Commercial Code. Powers, Distinguishing Between 
Products and Services In Strict Liability, 62 N.C.L. REV. 415, 415-17 (1984). 
The issue of what constitutes a product has raised some intriguing questions. 
For instance, the United States Supreme Court has held that a man-made microor-
ganism that is actually a form of life may be considered a patentable subject matter. 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Whether that organism would be 
subject to strict liability as a "product" remains to be determined. 
24. See, e.g., La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937,942-43 (3d Cir. 1968) (no 
strict liability where defendant had contract to design, engineer, and supervise con-
struction of plaintiff's plant despite the fact that defendant caused toxic dust to be 
released from the plant causing cancer in plaintiff's decedent, an employee of the 
plant); Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, 197 Idaho 32, 38, 539 P.2d 584, 587 (1975) 
(no strict liability where defendant's employees repaired, inspected, and tested the 
plaintiff's aircraft which subsequently crashed because defective bolt was over-
looked during inspection); Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 270 Or. 498, 500, 
528 P.2d 76, 77 (1974) (no strict liability where defendant negligently installed a 
nondefective tire on plaintiff's car). See also Powers, supra note 23, at 419. After 
the author examines the various arguments for excluding pure services from strict 
liability, he concludes that the selective imposition of strict liability to product 
transactions could be justified only by the difficulties of proof in product cases. Id. 
at 434. He suggests that "a court should resolve hybrid sales-services cases accord-
ing to its understanding of the rationale for treating products cases distinctly." !d. 
(emphasis added). 
25. First Nat'! Bank of Mobile v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 365 So. 2d 966 (Ala. 1978); cf 
Delaney v. Towrnotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964) (extending strict liability in a 
case involving the demonstration of a fork lift). 
26. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 
(1965). 
27. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967). 
28. Perfection Paint and Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681 
(1970) (where paint failed to adhere and lacquer provided free of charge was ignited 
by hot water heater causing death, the supplier was held to have placed the article in 
the "stream of commerce" regardless of whether sale occurred). 
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ing an item traditionally viewed as a product. For example, aircraft,29 
chemicals,30 drugs, 31 machinery,32 and motor vehicles33 are goods easily 
identified as products for the purposes of strict liability.34 However, elec-
tricity, 35 animals, 36 charts, 37 houses, 38 and computer programs, 39 are 
items not traditionally viewed as products and present subtle issues for 
courts to address. 
Courts considering whether a particular item or substance qualifies 
as a product typically focus on the public policy rationale underlying the 
imposition of strict liability. Under this public policy approach, courts 
place weight on various factors, including the manufacturer's conscious 
introduction of the product into the "stream of commerce," the need for 
consumer protection against an unknown manufacturer or seller, the 
need to spread the cost of injury, and the difficulty of proof of negli-
gence. 40 Some courts refuse to commit to a stringent definition of "prod-
29. See Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 288 (lOth Cir. 1977); First Nat'l Bank of 
Mobile v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 365 So.2d 966 (Ala. 1978). 
30. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1293 (D.D.C. 1982) (applying 
Maryland law), a.ff'd 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
31. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980); Weinberger v. Bris-
tol-Myers Co., No. M-85-5007, slip op. (D. Md. Dec. 4, 1986); Fellows v. USV 
Pharma. Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297 (D. Md. 1980); Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 
441 F. Supp. 377 (1975). 
32. See Holman v. Mark Indus., 610 F. Supp. 1195 (D. Md. 1985) (aerial lift); Troja v. 
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App. 101, 488 A.2d 516 (1985) (radial arm saw); 
Banks v. IronHustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 475 A.2d 1243 (1984) (conveyer belt 
on industrial machine); American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 
97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980) (industrial clothes dryer). 
33. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976) (car); Harley-
Davidson Motor Co. v. Wisniewski, 50 Md. App. 339, 437 A.2d 700 (1982) (motor-
cycle); Tensen v. American Motors Corp., 50 Md. App. 226, 437 A.2d 242 (1981) 
(car). 
34. Similarly, a court easily determined that a multi-tiered parking lot is not a product 
and that injuries sustained from a fall from an upper tier are not compensable under 
strict product liability. Lowrie v. City of Evanston, 50 Ill. App. 3d 376, 365 N.E.2d 
923 (1977). 
35. See, e.g., Public Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Nichols, 494 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. App. 1986); 
Schriner v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 348 Pa. Super. 177, 501 A.2d 1128 
(1985); United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 700, 
209 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1985). 
36. See Sease v. Taylor's Pets, 70 Or. App. 110, 700 P.2d 1054 (1985); Beyer v. Aqua-
rium Supply Co., 94 Misc. 2d 336, 404 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1977). 
37. See Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985). 
38. Bastian v. Wausau Homes, Inc, 620 F. Supp. 947 (D.C. Ill. 1985) (suit against 
builder-vendor of mass produced houses); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 65 
Haw. 447, 654 P.2d 343 (1982) (suit against manufacturer of prefabricated 
building). 
39. To date, computer software programs have generated relatively little litigation. 
Nevertheless, given the prevalence of computers in contemporary society and the 
increasing reliance on computer systems, it is likely that litigation will arise. Indu-
bitably, the question will arise whether a software program is a product or simply 
the provision of a service. 
40. Those types of policy arguments were articulated in many of the early cases which 
imposed stricdiability on manufacturers. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 59 
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (costs of injuries should be borne 
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uct" in order to avoid burdening future courts with a definition that is 
unable to keep pace with technology.41 Although attractive on its face, 
this ad hoc approach might lead to a confusing series of inconsistent 
opinions. 
Appellate decisions involving electricity, charts, and animals illus-
trate the interlocking nature of the issues generated by the "sale of a 
product" requirement and the difficulty jurists have in resolving these 
issues. Case authority indicates that electricity may be a product.42As 
explained by one court: 
[Electricity] is a form of energy that can be made or produced 
by men, confined, controlled, transmitted and distributed to be 
used as an energy source for heat, power and light and is dis-
tributed in the stream of commerce. The distribution might 
well be a service, but the electricity itself, in the contemplation 
of the ordinary user, is a consumable product.43 
This court would apply strict liability when one is injured by distributed 
electricity, which is considered a product, but not when one is injured by 
electricity in transmission, which is considered a service.44 
by the manufacturer which put the product on the market); Seely v. White Motor 
Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (it is equitable to shift the 
risk of injury to manufacturers because they are better able to bear the loss); Markle 
v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 509 P.2d 529 (1973) (consumer expectation that 
product is safe for intended use is better protected by strict liability than by negli-
gence or warranty theories); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 
N.W.2d 488 (1967) (proof of defect is sufficient because it is often impossible for 
plaintiff to prove specific acts of negligence); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 
N.W.2d 55 (1967) (rule of strict liability relieves plaintiff of proving specific acts of 
negligence and protects him from certain defenses). 
41. In Kaneko v. Hilco Coast Processing, for example, the Supreme Court of Hawaii 
stated: 
In order to cope with technological advances, we decline to establish 
a firm definition of "product" to which the doctrine of strict liability ap-
plies. Rather, a product should be determined on a case-by-case basis with 
that determination guided by the applicable case law, the public policy 
considerations underlying strict liability, the comments to the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, and the Model Uniform Products Liability Act. 
65 Hawaii 447, 455, 654 P.2d 343, 349 (1982). 
42. See Public Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Nichols, 494 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. App. 1986) (allowing 
use of strict liability where dairy farmers' herds were injured by "stray" electricity); 
United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 700, 209 Cal. 
Rptr. 819 (1985) (explaining in dictum that electricity is a "product" once it is 
placed in the stream of commerce by transferring property or some property right); 
Smith v. Home Light and Power Co., 695 P.2d 788 (Colo. App. 1984) (electricity 
found to be a product). 
43. Schriner v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 348 Pa. Super. 177, 187, 501 A.2d 
1128, 1133 (1985) (quoting Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 
610, 275 N.W.2d 641, 643 (1979)). 
44. Hills v. Ozark Border Elec. Co-Op, 710 S.W.2d 338 (Mo. App. 1986) (opinion does 
not expressly state that strict liability applies to distributed electricity, but makes 
that assumption in determining that plaintiffs failed to establish a submissible case); 
Public Serv. Ind., Inc. v. Nichols, 494 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. App. 1986) (holding that 
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In Brocklesby v. United States,45 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit determined whether a chart that graphically de-
picted all pertinent aspects of an airplane instrument approach procedure 
was a product. 46 The court held that the chart was a product because it 
was developed for commercial purposes from Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration specifications and was mass produced and mass marketed.47 
Whether an animal is a product has also generated considerable de-
bate and conflicting decisions by courts ostensibly applying the same or 
similar product analysis. Historically, courts generally held that living 
organisms were not products within the scope of strict liability because 
the doctrine required that a product's nature be fixed when it leaves the 
control of the manufacturer or seller.48 The "fixed nature" requirement 
is based on section 402A which requires that the product reach the ulti-
mate user or consumer without substantial change.49 Unlike a product 
"stray" electricity was an "escaped" product that caused harm so that strict liability 
was not imposed on the provision of a service); Smith v. Home Light and Power 
Co., 695 P.2d 788 (Colo. App. 1984) (accepting that electricity is a product and its 
distribution is a service, the court would not impose strict liability where family 
members were electrocuted when they touched a portable grain auger to an over-
head powerline); Kentucky Util. Co. v. Auto Crane Co., 674 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1983) (strict liability did not apply where crane operator was injured when his 
crane touched overhead power lines; Kentucky has never adopted strict liability 
standard to transmission of electricity because electricity is a public necessity). 
45. 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985). 
46. Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 1985). 
47. /d. at 1294-95 (quoting Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339 
(9th Cir. 1981)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated: 
Jeppesen approach charts depict graphically the instrument approach pro-
cedure for the particular airport as the procedure has been promulgated by 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) after testing and administra-
tive approval. The procedure includes all pertinent aspects of the ap-
proach . . . . The specifications prescribed are set forth by the FAA in 
tabular form. Jeppesen acquires the FAA form and portrays the informa-
tion therein on a graphic approach chart. This is Jeppesen's "product." 
Aetna Casualty, 642 F.2d at 341-42 (applying Nevada law). 
48. See Kaplan v. C Lazy U Ranch, 615 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Colo. 1985). The 
Kaplans were guests at a ranch when Ann Kaplan injured herself by falling off a 
horse. In addition to negligence counts, the Kaplans asserted that the horse and 
saddle were "products" for the purpose of strict liability. The court stated: 
Plaintiffs' contention that a horse and saddle constitute a "product," while 
a novel idea, is rebutted by case law and the basic underlying policies of 
the doctrine of strict products liability. Generally, living things do not 
constitute "products" within the scope of the strict tort liability doctrine 
which requires that a product's nature be fixed when it leaves the manu-
facturer's or seller's control. 
/d. at 238. For other opinions supporting the proposition that animals are not prod-
ucts because they do not have a fixed nature, see Anderson v. Fanners Hybrid Cos., 
87 Ill. App. 3d, 493, 408 N.E.2d 1194 (1980) (unbred female pigs are not products); 
Whitmer v. Schneble, 29 Ill. App. 3d 659, 331 N.E.2d 115 (1975) (Doberman Pin-
scher that bit child was not a product). 
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A(l)(b) (1965) (providing for strict 
liability in action by ultimate user or consumer if the product "is expected to and 
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in 
which it is sold"). 
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that leaves the manufacturer or seller in a set form, living organisms such 
as animals are affected more easily by environmental changes and other 
forces beyond the control of the manufacturer or seller. Therefore, their 
characteristics may be influenced more by the purchaser than by the 
manufacturer or seller. It was for this reason that the Appellate Court of 
Illinois refused to extend strict product liability to a dog in Whitmer v. 
Schneble,50 and to fetal pigs in Anderson v. Farmers Hybird Cos .. 51 
Some courts have applied the doctrine of strict liability to animals. 52 
In a case involving a diseased hamster, Beyer v. Aquarium Supply Co.,53 a 
New York trial court looked to the public policy underlying strict liabil-
ity and compared animals to defective products. 54 The court observed 
that the purpose of strict liability is to distribute fairly the inevitable con-
sequences of commercial activity and to promote the marketing of safe 
products.55 The court stated that one who places a diseased animal in 
the stream of commerce should be accountable for his actions and 
concluded: 
The risk presented to human well being by a diseased animal is 
as great and probably greater than that created by a defective 
manufactured product and in many instances, for the average 
consumer, a disease in an animal can be as difficult to detect as 
a defect in a manufactured product. 56 
50. 29 Ill. App. 3d 659, 663-64, 331 N.E.2d 115, 119 (1975). 
51. 87 Ill. App. 3d 493, 500-01, 408 N.E.2d 1194, 1199 (1980). The Anderson opinion 
illustrates the product analysis used by some courts. The Anderson court reasoned: 
/d. 
While a "product" may be unchanged from its natural state, viable, and 
not the result of manufacturing processes, it must be of a fixed nature at 
the time it leaves the seller's control. Thus, while blood or mushrooms, 
both sold in their natural state, may be products, their nature, as products, 
is fixed, or is intended to be fixed, prior to the time they enter the stream of 
commerce. If properly packaged, they are not easily affected by internal 
or external processes in the same way a living creature is so affected. Liv-
ing creatures, such as swine in the instant case, are by their nature in a 
constant process of internal development and growth and they are also 
participants in a constant interaction with the environment around them 
as part of their development. Thus, living creatures have no fixed nature 
in the same sense as the blood or the mushrooms can be said to have a 
fixed nature at the time they enter the stream of commerce. 
52. Sease v. Taylor's Pets, Inc., 70 Or. App. 110, 700 P.2d 1054 (1985). Beyer v. Aqua-
rium Supply Co., 94 Misc. 2d 336, 404 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1977). One commentator 
believes that animals should be included selectively under product liability law. See 
Comment, The Applicability of Strict Products Liability to Sales of Live Animals, 61 
IOWA L. REv. 803 (1982). The author of this comment critically examines the 
trend which existed at that time to exclude animals from strict product liability. He 
concludes that animals should not be excluded categorically from product liability 
law in Illinois because such categorical exclusion misapplies product liability limita-
tions and inadequately accommodates public policy. /d. at 814, 824-25. 
53. 94 Misc. 2d 336, 404 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1977). 
54. Beyer v. Aquarium Supply Co., 94 Misc. 2d 336, 337, 404 N.Y.S.2d 778, 779 (1977). 
55. /d. . 
56. /d. 
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The Beyer court based its decision on a policy, although unarticulated, 
that marketing and distribution are the most crucial, if not the disposi-
tive factors in resolving the product issue. The Court of Appeals of Ore-
gon reached a similiar conclusion in Sease v. Taylor's Pets, Inc. 51 In 
Sease the doctrine of strict liability applied to a rabid skunk because the 
court found that the Oregon product liability statute supported a defini-
tion of a product that includes animals. 58 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has yet to address squarely the 
"sale of a product" requirement in a strict product liability case. In 
Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 59 however, the court expressly adopted the 
opinion of the court of special appeals60 which assumed that strict liabil-
ity applied to the sale and installation of a swimming pool and diving 
board without analyzing whether this transaction was the sale of a prod-
uct or the provision of a service. 61 Despite the lack of Maryland law on 
the "sale of a product" requirement, it is likely that Maryland will ap-
proach the sale of a product as other jurisdictions have by focusing on 
the nature of the actual transaction and on the public policy reasons un-
derlying the imposition of strict liability in product liability cases. 
2. Defect Requirement 
The gravamen of any product liability claim is proof that a product 
was defective. Determining what constitutes a defect has generated con-
fusion and debate.62 There are three forms of defects, each with a differ-
ent requirement of proof. The defect may be one of manufacturing, 
design, or adequacy of warning. 
a. manufacturing defect 
Manufacturing defects exist when a product fails to conform to a 
57. 74 Or. App. 110, 700 P.2d 1054 (1985). The court noted that the Oregon product 
liability statute "cover[ed] products that are subject to both natural change and 
intentional alteration" and provided a defense to the seller or manufacturer that the 
product had changed substantially since its sale or lease. /d. at 117, 700 P.2d at 
1058. 
58. /d. 
59. 295 Md. 285, 299, 455 A.2d 434, 441 (1983). 
60. 50 Md. App. 614, 620-26, 440 A.2d 1085, 1089-92 (1982), aff'd, 295 Md. 285, 455 
A.2d 434 (1983). 
61. /d. 
62. One observer has noted: 
At the very core of a product liability regime is the definition ascribed 
to the term 'defective,' since proof of defectiveness is the touchstone of any 
claim. In keeping with its central importance, the problem of defining 
defectiveness has exercised the minds of legal scholars perhaps more than 
any other aspect of product liability law. (footnote omitted) 
Clark, The Conceptual Basis of Product Liability, 48 Moo. L. REv. 325, 325 (1985). 
See also, Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liabil-
ity, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 373 (1965) ("[N]o single definition of defect has proved 
adequate to define the scope of the manufacturer's strict liability in tort for physical 
injuries .... "). 
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manufacturer's specifications. 63 Examples of manufacturing defects in-
clude the absence of components in a finished product,64 the use of im-
perfect raw materials,65 and the inclusion offoreign substances in food or 
drink. 66 In each case, the final product is different than the product the 
manufacturer intended to produce. An action based on a manufacturing 
defect requires a comparison of the allegedly defective product with that 
product's specifications. 67 Proof of a manufacturing defect requires little 
more than evidence that the product deviates from the manufacturer's 
own standards. 68 The manufacturer's defense focuses on other potential 
causes of the deviation from specifications such as misuse, alteration of a 
product, or some other act outside of the control of the manufacturer. 
b. design defect 
Design defects present more complex questions as to what consti-
tutes a defect.69 A design defect potentially exists when a product is not 
"reasonably safe" for its intended purpose because of the particular way 
it is designed. A product or its particular condition is not reasonably safe 
if it poses "inherently unreasonable risks" or the degree of risk presented 
by the product's design outweighs its utility.70 Examples of inherently 
unreasonable risks include a defective steering mechanism that causes a 
car to swerve off the road;71 an automobile drive shaft that separates 
from the automobile when driven in a normal manner; 72 a paydozer 
without rearview mirrors; 73 new automobile brakes that suddenly fail; 74 
an automobile accelerator that sticks without warning.75 In Phipps v. 
63. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 959 (1976); 
Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1981). 
64. VanSlyke v. Pargas, Inc., 69 A.D.2d 927, 415 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1979) (failure to prop-
erly odorize natural gas so that a leak could be detected before an explosion). 
65. Probus v. K-Mart, Inc., 794 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1986) (defect in use of a particular 
plastic as an end cap on a metal extension ladder); Ford Motor Co. v. Conrardy, 29 
Colo. App. 577, 488 P.2d 219 (1971) (nonmetallic particles in steering mechanism 
of car causing mechanism to break); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 
Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969) (defective steel causing hammer to chip upon 
contact); Taylor v. Carborundun Co., 107 Ill. App. 2d 12, 246 N.E.2d 898 (1969) 
(defect in composition of grinding wheel causing it to shatter). 
66. Obieli v. Campbell Soup Co., 623 F.2d 668 (lOth Cir. 1980) (defect where cock-
roach was discovered in a can of soup). 
67. Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1981). 
68. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344-45, 363 A.2d 955, 959 
(1976). 
69. As the court noted in Phipps, "[w]here ... the alleged defect is the result of the 
design process so that the product causing injury was in a condition intended by the 
manufacturer, the test [for strict liability] has proved more difficult to apply." /d. 
70. /d. at 345, 363 A.2d at 959. 
71. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
72. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 
(1969). 
73. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970). 
74. Sharp v. Chrysler Corp., 432 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). 
75. Phipps, 278 Md. at 345-46, 363 A.2d at 959. 
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General Motors Corp. ,16 the Court of Appeals of Maryland characterized 
situations such as those noted above as involving inherently unreasonable 
risks of such magnitude that there is no need to consider the utility of the 
design.77 The court stated that "[c]onditions like these, even if resulting 
from the design of the products, are defective and unreasonably danger-
ous without the necessity of weighing and balancing the various factors 
involved. "78 
An "inherently unreasonable risk" type of design defect is similar to 
a manufacturing defect because in both the product does not function as 
the manufacturer intended. Furthermore, both are determined in light of 
consumer expectations. 79 In the case of a design defect the product must 
be "unreasonably dangerous," and in the case of a manufacturing defect 
the product must be in a "defective condition," when the seller places the 
product on the market. 80 According to the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, both the defective condition and the unreasonably dangerous re-
quirements are met if the condition causing the injury is not one that 
would be contemplated by an ordinary consumer.81 
If the design defect is not inherently unreasonable, balancing the 
product's degree of risk against its utility is necessary. After reviewing 
several potential tests for defectiveness in these cases, the Supreme Court 
of Tennessee recently concluded that "it is an area of law characterized 
by much confusion and little agreement. " 82 Courts differ on whether the 
focus should be on the product's condition, the manufacturer's conduct, 
the manufacturer's knowledge (whether real or constructive), the con-
sumer's knowledge, or on various combinations thereof. 83 
76. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). 
77. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 345-46, 363 A.2d 955, 959 (1976). 
78. !d. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959. 
79. /d. at 344, 363 A.2d at 959. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A com-
ment g (1965) (A product is in a defective condition if, at the time it leaves the 
seller's hands, it is "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, 
which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."). 
80. /d. at 344-45, 363 A.2d at 959. 
81. /d. A product may be dangeorus yet not defective. In Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 
Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985), the plaintiff claimed that a handgun used to shoot 
him in an armed robbery was both defective and unreasonably dangerous because it 
was capable of being used during a crime to inflict harm. The court rejected plain-
tiff's argument that the handgun was defective, noting that a gun's dangerous 
propensities were inherent in its normal function. By way of example, the court 
stated: 
A handgun is dangerous because its normal function is to propel bul-
lets with deadly force. That alone is not sufficient for its manufacturer to 
incur liability under § 402A. For the handgun to be defective, there would 
have to be a problem in its manufacture or design, such as a weak or 
improperly placed part, that would cause it to fire unexpectedly or other-
wise malfunction. 
/d. at 136, 497 A.2d at 1148. 
82. Gann v. International Harvester Co. of Canada, 712 S.W.2d 100, 104-05 (Tenn. 
1986) ("In design defect cases, some jurisdictions have adopted the risk-utility test, 
while others have adopted the reasonably prudent manufacturer test."). 
83. /d. at 104. For a discussion of the various tests that courts apply in design defect 
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Maryland has adopted the "risk-utility" test for determining prod-
uct defectiveness. In Phipps, 84 the Court of Appeals of Maryland ex-
plained that "whether a particular design is defective may depend upon a 
balancing of the utility of the design and other factors against the magni-
tude of the risk."85 Under this test, seven factors are considered when 
determining whether a product is reasonably safe. The factors are: 
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its 
utility to the user and to the public as a whole. 
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that 
it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury. 
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would 
meet the same need and not be as unsafe. 
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe 
character of the product without impairing its usefulness or 
making it too expensive to maintain its utility. 
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of 
care in the use of the product. 
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inher-
ent in the product and their avoidability, because of general 
cases, see Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAN. L. 
REV. 551 (1980); Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negli-
gence (to Wa"anty) to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAN. L. REV. 593- (1980). 
The two principle tests are the "consumer expectation test" and the "risk-benefit" 
test. Under the consumer expectation test, a product is defective if, at the time it 
leaves the hands of the seller, it is in a condition not contemplated by the consumer 
and unreasonably dangerous to him. Barnes v. Vega Indus., 234 Kan. 1012, 676 
P.2d 761 (1984) (holding that unreasonably dangerous be defined in terms of the 
consumer expectation test). Under the risk-benefit test a product is defective if (l) it 
fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an 
intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) the risk of danger inherent in a 
particular design outweighs the benefits of that design. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 
Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978). Thus, this 
approach gives a plaintiff two "bites of the apple." In Singleton v. International 
Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1981), the court was urged to adopt the 
Barker "double bite" test, but refused to do so. ld. at 114. The court stated that 
under Maryland law, the test for a design defect in situations where there is not an 
inherently unreasonably risk is the risk-utility test. ld. at 115. See infra notes 79-84 
and accompanying text. The test does not incorporate a consideration of consumer 
expectation. 
84. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). 
85. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 348, 363 A.2d 955, 961 (1976). Sim-
ilarly, the Fourth Circuit, relying on Phipps in applying Maryland law in a product 
liability case, explained that "[i]n a design defect case the issue is whether a manu-
facturer, knowing the risks inherent in his product, acted reasonably in putting it on 
the market." Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 
1981). The risk-utility test was first articulated by Dean John W. Wade. Phipps, 
278 Md. at 345 n.4, 363 A.2d at 959 n.4. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort 
Liability for Products, 44 Mrss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973). Dean Wade first formu-
lated these factors, in shorter form, eight years earlier. See Wade, Strict Tort Liabil-
ity of Manufacturers, 19 S.W.L.J. 5, 17 (1965). 
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public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of 
the existence of suitable warnings or instructions. 
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of 
spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carry-
ing liability insurance. 86 
15 
The risk-utility test is simply a formal compilation of factors usually ex-
amined in product liability cases. As stated by the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland in Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 87 "these factors 
rationalize what most courts do in deciding design cases, although not all 
the factors are necessarily weighed nor is the risk/utility analysis denom-
inated as such."88 
Singleton v. International Harvester Co. 89 illustrates the application 
of the risk-utility test under Maryland law. In Singleton, the plaintiff was 
operating his tractor in an open field when the rear wheels became 
trapped in mud, causing the front end of the tractor to raise up, flip over, 
and trap him underneath. 90 The plaintiff contended that had the tractor 
been equipped with a rollover protective structure (ROPS) he would not 
have been injured and the absence of this structure on his 1948 model 
tractor was a design defect. The plaintiff, however, failed to produce evi-
dence for the finder of fact that questioned the reasonableness of market-
ing a tractor without a ROPS in 1948. According to the court, the 
necessary evidence would include: 
86. Wade, On The Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 837-38 
(1973). The Wade risk-utility test has been acknowledged repeatedly to be the ap-
propriate test for design defects which do not present an inherently unreasonable 
risk. In Phipps, the Court of Appeals of Maryland approved the risk-utility test, but 
did not have an opportunity to apply the test because the defect in that case fell 
within the unreasonably dangerous category that requires no balancing. Phipps, 278 
Md. at 345 n.4, 363 A.2d at 959 n.4. Five years later the Fourth Circuit applied the 
test to an allegedly defective tractor in Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 
F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying Maryland law under diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction). A year after Singleton, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland rec-
ognized the risk-utility test as applicable in some design defect cases in Sheehan v. 
Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 620 n.6, 440 A.2d 1085, 1089 n.6 (1982), aff'd, 
295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983), although the court did not rely upon the test in 
that case because the appellants failed to raise the issue at the trial level. Id. at 620 
n.6, 440 A.2d at 1089 n.6. The court of appeals expressly adopted the portion of the 
court of special appeals opinion recognizing the test in Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 
295 Md. 285, 289, 455 A.2d 434, 441 (1983). Finaliy, the court of appeals men-
tioned in dicta in Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 138, 497 A.2d 1143, 1149 
(1985) that it had acknowledged the test in earlier opinions. I d. at 138, 497 A.2d at 
1149. It seems certain that Maryland will rely on the risk-utility analysis in design 
defect cases where the defect does not present an inherently unreasonable risk. 
87. 50 Md. App. 614, 440 A.2d 1085 (1982), aff'd, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983). 
88. Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 620 n.6, 440 A.2d 1085, 1089 n.6 
(1982), aff'd, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983). For a discussion on judicial appli-
cation of the risk-utility test, see Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 172-
76, 386 A.2d816, 825-27 (1978). 
89. 685 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1981). 
90. Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 113 (4th Cir. 1981). 
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the technological feasibility of manufacturing a tractor with a 
ROPS in 1948, the availability of material for producing such a 
structure in 1948, the cost of producing such a structure in 
1948, the price to a consumer of a ROPS in 1948, and the 
chances for consumer acceptance of a tractor with a ROPS in 
1948.91 
Failure to produce this evidence resulted in a directed verdict for the 
manufacturer on the defective design claim. 92 Inasmuch as a goal of 
product liability law is to relieve plaintiffs of the burden of evidentiary 
hurdles, had the plaintiff in Singleton produced sufficient evidence to 
send the case to the jury on the defective design question, the burden of 
proof would then have shifted to the manufacturer to prove that the util-
ity of the tractor's design outweighed its risks. 
Maryland should continue to rely on the risk-utility test in design 
defect cases when the reasonableness of a particular design is at issue. 
Among the several tests and their variations,93 the risk-utility test best 
allows full consideration of the relative merits of a product's design with 
a fair placement of the burden of proof on the defendant manufacturer. 
Maryland need not venture into the confusion of the various other tests 
for design defects because Singleton indicates that Maryland already has 
a workbg body of law. 
c. failure to warn defect 
A failure to warn defect exists when a manufacturer's failure to pro-
vide an adequate warning makes a product dangerous and results in 
physical injury. Comment h to section 402A states that where a manu-
facturer "has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a particu-
lar use ... he may be required to give adequate warning of the danger ... 
and a product sold without such warning is in a defective condition."94 
Similarly, comment j states that "[i]n order to prevent the product from 
being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give direc-
tions or warnings, on the container, as to its use."95 
91. /d. at 115. 
92. /d. at 116. 
93. See supra note 82. 
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402 comment h (1965). 
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402 commentj (1965). For an excellent dis-
cussion of failure to warn .claims under section 402A, see Goodbar v. Whitehead 
Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Va. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 
213 (4th Cir. 1985). 
There is some similarity between a strict liability failure to warn claim under 
section 402A and strict liability imposed for misrepresentation under section 402B 
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). That section states: 
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels, 
or otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact 
concerning the character or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to 
liability for physical harm to a consumer of the chattel caused by justifi-
able reliance upon the misrepresentation even though (a) it is not made 
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There are differing views as to what constitutes a danger sufficiently 
great as to generate a duty to warn, the standard applied is similar to the 
reasonableness standard of negligence law.96 There is, however, a subtle 
difference. If the failure to warn is based upon strict liability law, the 
product without the warning must be unreasonably dangerous. If the 
failure to warn is based upon negligence law, the conduct of the manufac-
turer must be unreasonable. 97 Notwithstanding, both standards are prac-
tically indistinguishable because the condition of the product speaks 
directly to the conduct of the manufacturer and vice versa. Under strict 
liability duty to warn, the manufacturer has no duty to warn where the 
danger is either obvious98 or unforeseeable. 99 Depending upon the facts 
of each case, a plaintiff may have to establish that the danger was reason-
ably foreseeable, but not so foreseeable as to be obvious. 100 
fraudulently or negligently, and (b) the consumer has not bought the 
chattel from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402B (1965}. For an example of a case ap-
plying section 402B, see, Klages v. General Ordnance Equip. Corp., 240 Pa. Super. 
356, 367 A.2d 304 (1976). 
96. Applying Maryland law, the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia invoked a test of reasonable foreseeability in Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 552 
F. Supp. 1293 (D. D.C. 1982), aff'd, 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.}, cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 1062 (1984). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A commentj 
(1965) (strict liability for failure to warn); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 388 (1965) (negligence for failure to warn). 
97. See Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Serv., 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1984); Hayes v. 
Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273 (Mass. 1984). 
98. See, e.g., Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1982) (prolonged con-
sumption of alcohol can result in physical and mental injury); McWaters v. Steel 
Serv. Co., 597 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1979) (reinforcing steel rods used in vertical posi-
tion must be secured with proper amount of guy wires); Marshall v. Ford Motor 
Co., 446 F.2d 712 (lOth Cir. 1971) (failure to use seatbelt can result in injury); 
Posey v. Clark Equip. Co., 409 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969) 
(driver of forklift truck without overhead screen could be injured by falling boxes); 
Scheller v. Wilson Certified Foods, 114 Ariz. 159, 559 P.2d 1074 (1976) (trichinosis 
can be contracted from eating uncooked pork); Bookout v. Victor Comptometer 
Corp., 40 Colo. App. 417, 576 P.2d 197 (1978) (BB gun could injure an eye if fired 
at a person); Huft v. Elmhurst-Chicago Stone Co., 94 Ill. App.3d 1091, 419 N.E.2d 
561 (1981) (wet concrete can burn human skin); Hensley v. Muskin Corp., 65 Mich. 
App. 662, 238 N.W.2d 362 (1976) (one could be injured diving off seven foot high 
garage into four feet deep swimmming pool); Garrett v. Nissen Corp., 84 N.M. 16, 
498 P.2d 1359 (1972) (one could be injured jumping on trampoline); Berry v. Eck-
hardt Porsche Audi, Inc., 578 P.2d 1195 (Okla. 1978) (failure to use seatbelt can 
result in injury); Menard v. Newhall, 135 Vt. 53, 373 A.2d 505 (1977) (same); Kim-
ble v. Waste Sys. Int'l, 23 Wash. App. 331, 595 P.2d 569 (1979) (one can fall out of 
driver's compartment of truck). 
99. See RESTATEMEl'iT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A comment h (1965) (duty to warn 
only arises where danger is one that manufacturer "has reason to anticipate"); see 
also, Baker v. International Harvester Co., 660 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (not 
foreseeable that agricultural combine would be used for hunting); Landrine v. Mego 
Corp., 95 A.D. 2d 75.9, 464 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1983) (not foreseeable that child would 
swallow balloon attached to a doll which made the doll simulate blowing a bubble). 
100. For examples of manufacturers which have been held strictly liable for failure to 
warn, see Melancon v. Western Auto Supply Co., 628 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980) (the 
danger of emission of flame from lawn mower muffler); Steinmetz v. Bradbury Co., 
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In determining when reasonable foreseeability gives rise to a duty to 
warn, Maryland has taken an expansive view. In American Laundry 
Machine Industries v. Horan, 101 the court of special appeals stated that 
"a manufacturer's duty to produce a safe product, with appropriate 
warnings and instructions when necessary, is no different from the re-
sponsibility each of us bears to exercise due care to avoid unreasonable 
risk of harm to others."102 The pertinent inquiry, the court concluded, 
"is not whether the harm that occurred - the actual use - was itself 
foreseeable, but rather whether it fell within a general field of danger 
which should have been anticipated."103 
In Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 104 the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia applied Maryland law in a strict lia-
bility case. The court suggested that a warning may be inadequate if it is 
not sufficiently conspicuous. 105 The court stated that a warning may not 
be adequate if it fails to state that a particular injury could occur, 106 and 
if the instructions fail to inform the user "what the result will be if he 
fails to follow them." 107 
618 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1980) (the danger of operating machine with rollers exposed); 
Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chern. Co., 524 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1975) (the danger of 
chemicals exploding); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th 
Cir. 1975) (the danger of contracting asbestosis from installation of asbestos); Filler 
v. Rayex Corp., 435 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1970) (special sunglasses designed for base-
ball will shatter if struck by a baseball); Reed v. John Deere, 569 F. Supp. 371 
(M.D. La. 1983) (a tractor started in neutral is capable of moving in reverse); 
LeBouefv. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 451 F. Supp. 253 (D.C.W.D. La.), aff'd, 
623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980) (automobile tires might blow out if traveling at exces-
sively high speed); Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (the danger of using explosives); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 
265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968) (automobile tires might blow out if 
carrying more than described weight); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 
727 (Minn. 1980) (pajama fabric is flammable), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980); 
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Schupbach, 93 Nev. 158, 561 P.2d 450 (1977) (electric 
cart used in chemical plant was not sparkproof); Degen v. Bayman, 241 N.W.2d 
703 (S.D. 1976) (a boat could be started in any gear); Ruiz v. Flexonics, 517 S.W.2d 
853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (a rubber hose is not suitable for connecting gas outlet to 
space heater). 
101. 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980). 
102. American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 101,412 A.2d 407,411 
(1980) (citing Moran v. Faberge', Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975)). 
103. American Laundry, 45 Md. App. at 104, 412 A.2d at 413. 
104. 552 F. Supp. 1293 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 
u.s. 1062 (1984). 
105. Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1293, 1303 (D. D.C. 1982), aff'd, 736 
F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). In Ferebee, the plaintiff's 
claim was premised on both negligence and strict liability. 
106. /d. at 1304. 
107. /d. The court explained that "[i]f Mr. Ferebee was not warned that dermal expo-
sure could seriously injure and even kill him, his failure to prevent that exposure 
cannot be deemed misuse." /d. at 1305. See also Billiar v. Minnesota Mining and 
Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, (2d Cir. 1980); Boy1 v. California Chern. Co., 221 F. Supp. 
669 (D. Ore. 1963) and D'Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 125 N.J. Super. 224, 310 A.2d 
106 (1973). 
Recently, an Illinois appellate court addressed the adequacy of warning issue. 
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The issue arising out of an allegation of failure to warn in a product 
liability case is whether the warning was adequate. 108 Because the warn-
ing issue is so simple, plaintiffs need not develop the elaborate expert 
testimony which may be required to prove a manufacturing or design 
defect. In Ferebee, for example, the court held that such expert testi-
mony was not required to establish the inadequacy of a warning on a 
herbicide. 109 The court explained that it could "think of no question 
more appropriately left to a common sense lay judgment than that of 
whether a written warning gets its message across to an average per-
son."110 The court's conclusion was based upon the premise that the 
warnings on labels are addressed to laymen, not to experts on labeling. 111 
A Maryland appellate court has not expressly imposed strict liabil-
ity for failure to warn under section 402A. Traditionally, Maryland 
courts have acknowledged a duty to warn in negligence. 112 Given the 
similarity between the duty to warn in negligence and in strict liability, 
the court of appeals probably would apply strict liability to a failure to 
warn claim. 
3. "Unreasonably Dangerous" Requirement 
In Maryland a plaintiff must prove not only that a product was in a 
defective condition when it left the control of the seller, but also that it 
was "unreasonably dangerous in order to recover under strict liabil-
ity."113 In some states a plaintiff need only show that a product was 
The court explained that "[w]amings may be inadequate if they: 1) do not specify 
the risk presented by the product; 2) are inconsistent with how a product would be 
used; 3) do not provide the reason for the warnings; or 4) do not reach foreseeable 
users." Collins v. Sunnyside Corp., 146 Ill. App. 3d 78, 80, 496 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 
(1986) (emphasis added). See also, Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 136 Ariz. 556, 
667 P.2d 750 (1983) (failure to warn of the fatal result if instructions were not fol-
lowed on use of extension cords). 
108. Ferebee, 552 F. Supp. at 1304. Although this issue was not addressed on appeal, the 
opinion of the trial court was upheld. Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d 
1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
109. Ferebee, 552 F. Supp. at 1304. 
110. /d. The court countered the defendant's expert testimony argument by noting that 
"it is to the layman that the warning is addressed not to the expert on labelling." 
111. Id. The court explained that although effective labelling is a recognizable area of 
expertise, "even an expert on the subject can decide whether a label is adequate only 
by measuring the reactions of average people." Id. 
112. Moran v. Faberge, 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975). The Moran opinion, discuss-
ing existing Maryland law for negligent failure to warn, articulated that the scope of 
the duty extends to the "general field of danger" that a manufacturer should antici-
pate. /d. at 551-52, 332 A.2d at 19. Moran is the landmark decision for negligent 
failure to warn claims under Maryland law. American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. 
Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980). 
113. In Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976), the court of 
appeals stated: 
for a seller to be liable under § 402A, the product must be ... "unrea-
sonably dangerous" at the time that it is placed on the market by the 
seller .... An "unreasonably dangerous" product is defined in Comment i 
as one which is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be con-
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defective because the unreasonably dangerous requirement is thought to 
introduce burdensome elements of negligence into a strict liability 
claim.ll4 
The unreasonably dangerous requirement is met by proving either a 
manufacturing defect, 115 a design defect, 116 or a failure to warn defect. 117 
Determining whether the defect renders the product unreasonably dan-
gerous depends upon the expectation of the user. As stated in comment i 
of section 402A, an unreasonably dangerous product is one that is "dan-
gerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the 
ordinary consumer." 118 If a product causes injury in a way not contem-
plated by the typical user, it is deemed unreasonably dangerous, unless it 
is made safe for reasonably foreseeable uses through an adequate 
warning. 119 
4. "Without Substantial Change" Requirement 
Because liability is conditioned upon a user receiving the product 
without substantial change from the condition in which it was sold, 120 
the plaintiff must show that the product was in a defective condition 
when it left the seller's hands. 121 In Virgil v. "Kash N' Karry" Service 
templated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary 
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." 
/d. at 344, 363 A.2d at 959 (quoting REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 402A (1965)). 
114. See, e.g., Bertles v. Guest, 477 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania 
law); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 
(1972); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 
(1979). 
115. Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 Ill. App.2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968), aff'd, 46 Ill. 2d 64, 
264 N.E.2d 170 (1970) (nail defectively manufactured which splintered). 
116. Hammond v. International Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646 (3d Cir. 1982) (front end 
loader delivered without roller over guard and side screens); Ilnicki v. Montgomery 
Ward Co., 371 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1967) (various design defects on lawnmover); 
Johnston v. Ford Motor Co., 443 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. La. 1978) (defective design in 
auto jack causing it to collapse); Richey v. Sumoge, 273 F. Supp. 904 (D. Or. 1967) 
(inadequate guard on brush cutter); Richelman v. Kekwanee Mach. & Conveyor 
Co., 59 Ill. App. 3d 578, 375 N.E.2d 885 (1978) (excessively wide spacing between 
bars of grain auger guard). 
117. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text. 
118. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A comment i (1965). 
119. Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 595-96, 495 A.2d 348, 355 (1985). 
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A (1965). 
121. Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 597, 495 A.2d 348, 356 (1985) 
(plaintiff must show "that the product was in a defective condition when it left the 
hands of the seller"); Virgil v. "Kash N' Karry" Serv. Corp., 61 Md. App. 23, 32-
33, 484 A.2d 652, 656-57 (1984) (in case of an exploding thermos, plaintiff had to 
demonstrate that it was more likely than not that the defect existed at the time of 
sale). For other cases placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff, see Hollinger v. 
Wagner Mining Equip. Co., 505 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Pa.), vacated on other grounds, 
667 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1981); Southwire Co. v. Beloit Eastern Corp., 370 F. Supp. 
842 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Seeborg v. General Motors Corp., 284 Or. 695, 588 P.2d 1100 
(1978); Weatherford v. H.K. Porter, Inc., 560 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. App. 1977). 
Although most courts follow the general rule that the burden falls on the plain-
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Corp., 122 the court of special appeals considered the sufficiency of evi-
dence required to show that a product was defective at the time of sale. 
The court stated: 
[P]roof of a defect must rise above surmise, conjecture or spec-
ulation; and one's right to recovery may not rest on any pre-
sumption [of defect] from the happening of an accident. As 
Dean Prosser noted, "The bare fact that an accident happens to 
a product ... is usually not sufficient proof that it was in any 
way defective. . . . On the other hand, the addition of very little 
more in the way of other facts ... may be enough to support 
the inference."123 
When analyzing whether a product was defective at the time of sale, 
Maryland courts have focused upon whether there was a "substantial" 
change in the product. 124 In Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 125 the court of 
special appeals surveyed the conflicting opinions on the substantial 
change requirement and summarized, "Some courts stress the foresee-
ability of the alteration; others speak simply to whether the change made 
an otherwise safe product unsafe; and others, borrowing from the law of 
negligence, view the matter as whether the alteration constituted a super-
vening cause."126 The common denominator in the cases is that "in most 
cases, the substantiality of the change is a question of fact, and if there is 
any conflict in the evidence, it is for the jury to determine." 127 
5. "Proximate Cause" Requirement 
After proving the existence of a defect attributable to a seller or 
ti1f to prove that a product was defective at the time of sale, there appears to be a 
tendency in some states to shift the burden to the defendant to show that there was 
no defect. For example, in Sease v. Taylor Pets, Inc., 74 Or. App. 110, 700 P.2d 
1054 (1985), the Court of Appeals of Oregon stated that under the Oregon product 
liability statute, the seller of an allegedly rabid skunk could present the defense that 
the skunk had changed substantially since its sale. I d. at 117, 700 P .2d at 1058. The 
statute discussed in Sease apparently relieves a p1ainti1f of the burden of showing 
that he satisfied the section 402A requirement that the product causing the injury 
was defective as sold. 
122. 61 Md. App. 23, 484 A.2d 652 (1984). 
123. Virgil v. "Kash N' Karry" Serv. Corp., 61 Md. App. 23, 32, 484 A.2d 652, 657 
(1984). 
124. See Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 295 Md. 285, 299, 455 A.2d 434, 441 (1983) (ex-
pressly adopting the opinion of court of special appeals that liability exists only if 
the product is used without substantial change); Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 
Md. App. 408, 432, 475 A.2d 1243, 1255 (1984) (holding that liability is conditioned 
on the product reaching the consumer without substantial change). 
125. 59 Md. App. 408, 475 A.2d 1243 (1984). 
126. Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 432, 475 A.2d 1243, 1255 (1984). In 
Banks, the court surmised that "[p]erhaps because of the varying fact patterns from 
which the question arises, the courts have not yet settled on any uniformly ex-
pressed standard for judging when an alteration will or will not suffice to absolve the 
manufacturer of liability." Id. 
127. Id. 
22 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
manufacturer, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defect proximately 
caused the injury. 128 The Fourth Circuit has held that to establish proxi-
mate causation in Maryland, the plaintiff must prove that the defend-
ant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about his injury. 129 In 
failure to warn cases the required causation is the stricter "but for" stan-
dard of causation; 130 if a warning would not have prevented the injury, 
the failure to warn was not the proximate cause of the injury. 131 
B. Negligence 
With the emergence and rapid development of strict liability, less 
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1966); Virgil v. "Kash N' 
Karry" Serv. Corp., 61 Md. App. 23, 30, 484 A.2d 652, 656 (1984) (citing Phipps v. 
General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976)). 
129. Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162 (4th Cir. 1986). In 
Lohrmann, the court applied Maryland law in a strict liability action filed by a 
shipyard pipe fitter who allegedly contracted asbestosis from products containing 
asbestos used in the shipyard. The court relied upon Robin Express Transfer, Inc. 
v. Canton R.R., 26 Md. App. 321, 338 A.2d 335 (1975), and stated that "in Mary-
land, the plaintiff must introduce evidence which allows the jury to reasonably con-
clude that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a 
substantial factor in bringing about the result." Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 1162. The 
court noted that this standard was the same as that set forth in the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS§ 431, which provides: 
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) 
his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) 
there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the 
manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm. 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 431 (1967). Comment a to§ 431 elaborates 
on the substantial factor requirement: 
The word "substantial" is used to denote the fact that the defendant's 
conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable 
men to regard it as a cause, using that word in a popular sense, in which 
there always lurks the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called 
"philosophic sense" which includes every one of the great number of 
events without which any happening would not have occurred. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 431 comment a (1967). 
Some courts have construed the substantial factor requirement to allow for lia-
bility even if the defect is not the sole cause of the injury; it is sufficient that the 
defect is the most probable cause or a concurrent cause. See Lifritz v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 472 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. App. 1971) (expert testimony that defect was most 
probable cause of accident sufficient for liability); Vlahovich v. Belts Mach. Co., 101 
Ill. App. 2d 123, 242 N.E.2d 17 (1969) (defect need not be the only cause, nor the 
last or nearest cause), aff'd, 45 Ill. 2d 506, 260 N.E.2d 230 (1970). 
130. See Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 116-17 (4th Cir. 1981). 
131. /d. In Singleton, the court found no error in an instruction that stated, "If you find 
that there was adequate warning given, but that under the circumstances the acci-
dent would have occurred even if an adequate warning had been given, then the 
manufacturer is not liable because the absence of a warning would not have been the 
proximate cause of the accident." /d. at 116. In Singleton, the plaintiff believed that 
he was operating a farm tractor on dry, level ground. The plaintiff testified that had 
he known the ground contained a mud hole, he would not have driven on the 
ground. Based on this testimony, a reasonable jury could have concluded that even 
if the plaintiff had read a warning, he would not have changed his conduct. /d. at 
ll7. 
1986] Product Liability in Maryland 23 
emphasis has been placed on the role of negligence in product liability 
actions. The negligence theory nevertheless remains important. There 
are certain tactical advantages to including a negligence claim in a prod-
uct liability action. A strict product liability claim focuses on the alleg-
edly defective product, but a negligence claim focuses on the product and 
any culpable conduct of the defendant. Directing attention to the de-
fendant's alleged carelessness not only generates sympathy among jurors, 
but also increases the likelihood of a punitive damages award. Punitive 
damages generally are not available under strict liability. 132 There is one 
potential disadvantage to including a negligence claim in the suit. In 
some jurisdictions, evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove 
culpable conduct is permitted under a strict liability theory, but not 
under a negligence theory. 133 In Maryland, however, the use of evidence 
132. The crucial inquiry in a strict product liability action is the condition of the product 
in question, not the culpability of the defendant's conduct. See, e.g., Werner v. 
Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857-58 (4th Cir.) {applying Maryland law), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 1081 (1980); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 
955, 962 (1976); Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579, 594-95, 
398 A.2d 490, 500 (1979). Punitive damages are unavailable because they are in-
compatible with the concepts underlying product liability law. See Butcher v. Rob-
ertshaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692, 704-05 (D. Md. 1981). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has not determined whether punitive dam-
ages are available in a strict product liability action. The court of special appeals 
discussed the issue in American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 
412 A.2d 407 (1980). In Horan, the court reversed a judgment for punitive damages 
in a product liability action which was submitted to the jury under theories of negli-
gence and strict liability. Noting that the court of appeals had not resolved the 
issue, the court declined to rule on the issue of whether punitive damages could be 
recovered in a strict product liability action. /d. at 110-13, 412 A.2d at 416-17. The 
court held that punitive damages could be awarded under a negligence theory in a 
product liability action, but reversed the judgment for punitive damages because of 
the lack of proof of wanton and reckless conduct that was a prerequisite to the 
recovery of punitive damages. /d. The issue remains open and will most likely be 
the focus of attention in future actions. See also Holman v. Mark Indus., 610 F. 
Supp. 1195, 1205-06 (D. Md. 1985) (disallowing punitive damages in products lia-
bility case in absence of negligence or actual malice). 
133. See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 120, 528 P.2d 1148, 1152, 
117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 816 (1974) (statute that provided that remedial measures were 
inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct dip not encompass strict liabil-
ity cases). The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland noted in Troja v. Black & 
Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App. 101,488 A.2d 516 (1985) that courts are divided on 
the application of Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the question of 
whether evidence of subsequent remedial measures in design or failure to warn 
products liability cases should be admitted. /d. at 113, 488 A.2d at 521-22. Rule 
407, captioned "Subsequent Remedial Measures," provides: 
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, 
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent 
measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in con-
nection with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evi-
dence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as 
proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if 
controverted, or impeachment. 
FED. R. Evm. 407. Some courts apply Rule 407 to bar the admission of evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures to prove culpable conduct in strict liability actions. 
24 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
of subsequent remedial measures to prove culpable conduct is never 
allowed. 134 
The traditional elements of negligence are: (1) a duty owed by the 
defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; (3) 
an injury; and (4) that the injury proximately result from the defendant's 
breach of the duty. 135 The first of these elements has been elaborated 
upon in section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 388 
states that a supplier of chattels will be liable for an injury proximately 
caused by a defect if the supplier knows or has reason to know that the 
chattel is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, has 
no reason to believe that those using the chattel would realize the danger, 
and fails to exercise reasonable care to warn of the danger. 136 The Court 
Other courts hold that Rule 407 does not apply in strict liability actions. Troja, 62 
Md. App. at 113, 488 A.2d at 521-22. 
134. Troja, 62 Md. App. at 113, 488 A.2d at 522. See also Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 
F.2d 848, 856-58 (4th Cir. 1980). In Werner, the court was urged to adopt the 
position taken inAult, 13 Cal. 3d 113,528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, that the 
rule against admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures does not apply in 
product liability cases. Werner, 628 F.2d at 857. The Werner court rejected the 
Ault position, explaining that the Ault court "assumes that the product is defective, 
and thus overlooks the situation where the product is not defective but could be 
made better." /d. The court observed further that allowing evidence of remedial 
measures in strict product liability actions was contrary to the rationale of Rule 407. 
The court stated: 
/d. 
The rationale behind Rule 407 is that people in general would be less likely 
to take subsequent remedial measures if their repairs or improvements 
would be used against them in a lawsuit arising out of a prior accident. By 
excluding this evidence, defendants are encouraged to make such improve-
ments. It is difficult to understand why this policy should apply any differ-
ently where the complaint is based on strict liability as well as negligence. 
From a defendant's point of view it is the fact that the evidence may be 
used against him which will inhibit subsequent repairs or improvement 
[sic]. It makes no difference to the defendant on what theory the evidence 
is admitted; his inclination to make subsequent repairs will be similarly 
repressed. 
In Troja, the court of special appeals found the reasoning of the Werner court 
to be persuasive and decided to "stand beside Werner and hold that in a strict liabil-
ity case evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not admissible to prove culpa-
ble conduct." Troja, 62 Md. App. at 114, 488 A.2d at 522. 
135. Read Drug and Chern. Co. v. Colwill Constr. Co., 250 Md. 406, 412, 243 A.2d 548, 
553 (1968) (quoting Jackson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 176 Md. 1, 5, 3 A.2d 719, 721 
(1939)). 
136. Section 388 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides: 
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for an-
other to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect 
to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its 
probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the 
manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the 
supplier 
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dan-
gerous for the use for which it is supplied, and 
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is sup-
plied will realize its dangerous condition, and 
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of Appeals of Maryland has stated that "a manufacturer's duty to pro-
duce a safe product, with appropriate warnings and instructions when 
necessary, is no different from the responsibility each of us bears to exer-
cise due care to avoid unreasonable risk of harm to others." 137 Accord-
ing to the Restatement, the duty owed by the manufacturer imposes 
liability for the negligent design, manufacture, testing, and inspection of 
the product, including the testing and· inspection of component parts 
made by another that are incorporated in a manufacturer's product. 138 
A similar duty is incumbent on a component maker, a material proces-
sor, or a seller assuming the role of manufacturer. 139 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland expressly has incorporated into 
the negligence formula the obligation set forth in section 388 that the 
manufacturer warn of dangers that it knows or should know will not be 
contemplated by the public. 140 The warning requirement generally calls 
for a reasonable warning, not for the best possible warning. 141 Where an 
adequate warning would not have prevented the harm from occurring, a 
manufacturer is not liable for breaching its duty to warn because the lack 
of a warning was not the cause of the harm. 142 
As with strict liability duty to warn, courts have barred recovery 
under negligence where the danger is not reasonably foreseeable, 143 and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condi-
tion or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 388 (1965). 
137. American Laundry Mach. Co. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 101-02, 412 A.2d 407, 
411 (1980) (quoting Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543, 332 A.2d 11, 15 
(1975)). 
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 388, 396 (1965). 
139. Liability may exist against any member of the distributive chain because each is 
responsible in varying degrees for a product reaching the hands of the person in-
jured by the product. This may not continue to be the case. With the adoption of 
comparative negligence, minimally liable parties have become less attractive targets. 
Additionally, one of the primary rationales for the imposition of strict product lia-
bility was the difficulty in bringing the responsible party to court. With the advent 
of effective long arm jurisdiction statutes, it is less difficult for a plaintiff to bring the 
proper defendant to court, thereby eliminating the need to sue all potential parties in 
hope of including the culpable party. 
140. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543-50, 332 A.2d 11, 15-19 (1975). See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 388 (1965). 
141. Levin v. Walter Kidde & Co., 251 Md. 560, 564, 248 A.2d 151, 154 (1968). 
142. Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 116-17 (4th Cir. 1981). 
143. See, e.g., Rowe v. John C. Motter Printing Press Co., 305 F. Supp. 1001 (D. R.I. 
1969) (no duty to warn that printing press should not be cleaned when not in "off 
impression" state); Johnston v. Upjohn Co., 442 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. App. 1969) (no 
duty to warn of possible allergic reaction where there was no evidence that such 
reaction might occur); Beck v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 76 Wash. 2d 95, 
455 P.2d 587 (1969) (no duty to warn of danger that product might erupt when 
poured into automobile radiator where there was no evidence that such eruption 
had ever occurred before); Ford Motor Co. v. Wolber, 32 F.2d 18 (7th Cir.) (no 
duty to warn that tractor might overturn where there was no evidence of a faulty 
design or construction that indicated tractor had tendency to overturn), cert. denied, 
280 u.s. 565 (1929). 
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where the danger was so foreseeable as to be obvious. 144 Courts have 
expanded manufacturer liability, however, by extending the scope of 
foreseeable injuries to what arguably are unforeseeable accidents. In 
American Laundry Machine Industries v. Horan, 145 the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland held that a manufacturer was negligent for failing 
to warn that a commercial laundry dryer installed at a hospital might 
explode if used to dry a large hot-air balloon. 146 This decision, and 
others similar to it, has drawn some criticism for what is viewed as an 
abuse of the foreseeability requirement in the failure-to-warn context, 147 
but such criticism apparently has not dissuaded the courts. Perhaps 
courts disregard these criticisms because the cost of providing a warning 
is much less than the cost of changing a design. A court balancing a 
product's risks against its utilities has less difficulty finding a warning 
inadequate than finding a design inadequate. 
As with strict liability, the duty to warn is a continuing duty and 
may require a manufacturer to take curative steps for a product that al-
ready has been sold. 148 This includes the duty to recall the product or to 
repair the product after sale. In Rekab, Inc. v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., 149 a 
manufacturer was not held liable for an injury caused by a design defect. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that the manufacturer, after 
discovering the defect, warned the buyer of the design defect and shipped 
the buyer a new part with instructions for its installation. 150 Had the 
144. See, e.g., Posey v. Clark Equip. Co., 409 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.) (driver of forklift truck 
could be injured by falling boxes), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969); Hensley v. 
Muskin Corp., 65 Mich. App. 662, 238 N.W.2d 362 (1976) (one could be injured 
diving off seven foot high garage into four feet deep swimming pool); Garrett v. 
Nissen Corp., 84 N.M. 16, 498 P.2d 1359 (1972) (one could be injured jumping on 
trampoline); Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 
1984) (drinking grain alcohol can be harmful). 
145. 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980). 
146. American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 108, 412 A.2d 407, 
414-15 (1980). 
147. See J. ALLEE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 4.04(c)(3) (rev. ed. 1986). 
148. See Braniff Airways v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1969) (evidence 
that manufacturer of airplane engine knew that a change in the design of the engine 
had caused difficulties, and that the manufacturer took no effective remedies, was 
sufficient to allow the jury to decide whether manufacturer's negligence contributed 
to cause of crash). 
149. 261 Md. 141, 274 A.2d 107 (1971). 
150. Rekab, Inc. v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141, 142-48, 274 A.2d 107, 108-11 
(1971). In Rekab, the manufacturer determined that the design of the shaft in an 
amusement park ride was dangerous after it sold the ride. Jd. at 144, 274 A.2d at 
109. The manufacturer warned the buyer of the danger posed by the defective shaft 
and then shipped a replacement shaft without charge. Despite the warning, the 
buyer continued to operate the ride with the defective shaft. The shaft broke and 
injured a rider. A judgment in favor of the manufacturer in the suit filed by the 
amusement park was upheld by the court of appeals. Among the facts the court 
found persuasive was that the manufacturer clearly notified the buyer of the danger 
created by the defective shaft and that the manufacturer shipped a new shaft which 
easily could have been replaced. Jd. at 149, 274 A.2d at 112. 
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manufacturer not issued the post-sale warnings and made efforts to cure 
the design defect it presumably would have been held liable. 
In contrast to the relatively simple task of proving negligence in a 
failure-to-warn case, proving negligence in a negligent design case can be 
especially difficult. The reasonableness standard may be difficult to apply 
because technical expertise is required in designing, manufacturing, and 
testing a product, and there are often no clear industry standards with 
which to compare the manufacturer's actions. Moreover, between the 
time of manufacture and injury, the product may pass through many 
hands, each with enough control to cause the injury through negligence. 
In response to the difficulty of proving negligent design, courts have 
extended the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to products liability. Res ipsa 
loquitur is an evidentiary rule that creates a rebuttable presumption of a 
defendant's negligence. The doctrine applies only if an event ordinarily 
would not have happened without negligence, the instrumentality which 
caused the injury was within the defendant's exclusive control, and no 
action by the plaintiff or a third party caused of the event.m It was 
applied, for example, to an electrical shock in a telephone booth 152 and 
the explosion of a soft drink bottle.t53 
The "patent danger" doctrine has made recovery for negligent de-
sign in product liability cases more difficult. Under this doctrine, there is 
no manufacturer negligence if the product functions properly and if the 
dangers of the product are known or obvious to the user. The Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland has questioned the state's adherence to the 
patent danger rule. In Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 154 the court stated 
that "the manufacturer of the obviously defective product ought not to 
escape because the product was obviously a bad one."155 Although the 
court of appeals has recognized the patent danger rule repeatedly,156 the 
rule has fallen out of favor across the country.t 57 It is likely that the 
151. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Hicks, 25 Md. App. 503, 515, 337 A.2d 744,752 
(1975). 
152. Id. In Hicks the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur did not apply because the plaintiff, injured by an electrical shock in a 
telephone booth, failed to prove that the booth was in the exclusive control of the 
defendant telephone company. /d. at 535, 337 A.2d at 762. Had the plaintiff been 
able to establish the telephone company's exclusive control, presumably the doctrine 
could have been applied. 
153. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 
(1975). In Giant Food, the court applied the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to the retailer 
of the bottled soda but not to the bottler. Id. at 599, 332 A.2d at 5. 
154. 59 Md. App. 408, 475 A.2d 1243 (1984). 
155. Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 422, 475 A.2d 1243, 1250 (1984) 
(quoting Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, 3 Wash. App. 508, 517, 476 P.2d 713, 719 
(1970)). 
156. See Volkswagen of Am. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974); Patten v. 
Logemann Bros., 263 Md. 364, 283 A.2d 567 (1971); Myers v. Montgomery Ward 
& Co., 253 Md. 282,252 A.2d 855 (1969); Blankenship v. Morrison Mach. Co., 255 
Md. 241, 257 A.2d 430 (1969). 
157. The rule was formulated first by the Court of Appeals of New York in Campo v. 
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Maryland court of appeals will abandon the rule the next time the issue 
arises. 158 
C Warranty 
An individual injured by a product will often pursue a claim for 
breach of warranty under the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code 
(Code). The warranty may be an express warranty, 159 an implied war-
ranty of merchantability, 160 or an implied warranty of fitness for a partie-
Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), but abandoned by that court in Mi-
callef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976). A 
majority of jurisdictions have rejected the rule. Gann v. International Harvester 
Co., 712 S.W.2d 100, 105-06 (Tenn. 1986). 
158. Maryland's adoption and repeated reaffirmance occurred prior to the abandonment 
of the rule by New York and other jurisdictions. Maryland probably will follow the 
trend of discarding the rule when .next presented with the opportunity. 
159. Mo. CoM. LAW CoDE ANN. § 2-313 (1975). The section provides: 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
/d. 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer 
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the 
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform 
to the affirmation or promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the 
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform 
to the description. 
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bar-
gain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall 
conform to the sample or model. 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller 
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a 
specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the 
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's 
opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. 
The existence of an express warranty is generally a question of fact, as where a 
seller stated that he used a gasoline motor around the farm and that the motor "ran 
real good." The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that whether that com-
ment was a statement of past experience and therefore not a warranty or whether 
the statement was a reference to the quality, capability, or condition of the motor 
was a question for the jury to answer. Barb v. Wallace, 45 Md. App. 271, 279, 412 
A.2d 1314, 1316 (1980). Where a seller warranted a vehicle's merchantability and 
fitness for an ordinary purpose without setting out the terms and conditions for the 
warranty, the court of special appeals held that there could be no claim for breach of 
an express warranty absent an allegation that the representation constituted the ba-
sis of the sale. Thomas v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 48 Md. App. 617, 624, 429 A.2d 
277, 283 (1981). 
160. Mo. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-314 (1975 & Supp. 1986). The section provides: 
(1) Unless excluded or modified(§ 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall 
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a 
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the 
serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the prem-
ises or elsewhere is a sale. Notwithstanding any other provisions of 
this title 
(a) In §§ 2-314 through 2-318 of this title, "seller" includes the manu-
. facturer, distributor, dealer, wholesaler or other middleman or the 
retailer; and 
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ular purpose. 161 To recover in any warranty action one must prove: (1) 
a warranty existed; (2) the product did not conform to that warranty; 
and (3) the breach proximately caused the injury or damage. 162 
As injured parties increasingly rely on strict liability, warranty ac-
tions, like negligence actions, have declined in popularity. Nevertheless, 
warranty actions have one unique advantage. Under strict liability or 
negligence, an individual may recover for damages to property caused by 
a defective product only after establishing personal injury, or that a clear 
risk of death or personal injury existed. 163 Under a warranty claim, how-
ever, one may recover for purely economic damage. 164 
/d. 
(b) Any previous requirement of privity is abolished as between the 
buyer and the seller in any action brought by the buyer. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as 
(a) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; 
and 
(b) In the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the 
description; and 
(c) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; 
and 
(d) Run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even 
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units 
involved; and 
(e) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement 
may require; and 
(f) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the 
container or label if any. 
(3) Unless excluded or modified (§ 2-316) other implied warranties may 
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade. 
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) of this section apply to a lease of goods and a 
bailment for hire of goods that pass through the physical possession of 
and are maintained by the lessor, sublessor, or bailor. 
By far the most successful of the warranties in product liability suits, the im-
plied warranty of merchantability arises from the fact of sale. In contrast, the im-
plied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or the express warranty rely on the 
particular purpose envisioned by the buyer and seller in a transaction. See Anthony 
Pools v. Sheehan, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983). 
161. Mo. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-315 (1975). This section provides: 
/d. 
(1) Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know 
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the 
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suita-
ble goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an 
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose. 
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) apply to a lease of goods and a 
bailment for hire of goods which pass through the physical possession of 
and are maintained by the lessor, sublessor, or bailor. 
Under a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose a seller is obligated to 
provide goods to meet the buyer's particular purpose as made known to the seller. 
Barb, 45 Md. App. at 280-81, 412 A.2d at 1319. 
162. Fischbach & Moore Int'l Corp. v. Crane Barge R-14, 632 F.2d 1123, 1125 (4th Cir. 
1980) (citing Mattas, Inc. v. Hash, 279 Md. 371, 368 A.2d 993 (1977)). 
163. See Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condo., Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting 
Co., 308 Md. 18, 33-41, 517 A.2d 336, 344-48 (1986). 
164. The line of demarcation between physical harm to an individual's person and his 
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Ill. EMERGING THEORIES OF RECOVERY 
A. The ''Saturday Night Special" Opinion 
As noted in this article's introduction, courts constantly reexamine 
the policies underlying the imposition of strict liability when confronted 
by circumstances in which one is injured by a product but is unable to 
recover under an established theory. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
recently encountered such a situation in Kelley v. R. G. Industries, Inc. 165 
In Kelley, the plaintiff was the victim of a handgun shooting that oc-
curred during an armed robbery. 166 The plaintiff could not prevail on a 
section 402A strict liability claim, because the gun was not "defective" 
within the meaning of that section.167 The plaintiff also could not prevail 
on an "abnormally dangerous activity" claim, because the injury did not 
result from the manufacturer's use of land, and a danger relating to the 
ownership or occupation of land had historically been required in such a 
claim.t6s 
property, on one hand, and purely economic loss, on the other, reflects the line 
between tort and contract theories. See Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 
49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 198, 364 N.E.2d 100, 104 (1977). Because a pervasive statutory 
scheme governs warranty claims in product liability cases, it seems inappropriate to 
extend negligence law to situations where recovery for purely economic loss is 
sought. See Copiers, Typewriters & Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. 
Supp. 312, 326 (D. Md. 1983). The Court of Appeals of Maryland has recently 
indicated a willingness to reexamine the rule that prevents recovery for economic 
injuries under strict liability or negligence. See Atlantis Condo., 308 Md. at 39, 517 
A.2d at 344-45 (1986). 
165. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985). 
166. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 128, 497 A.2d 1143, 1144 (1985). 
167. I d. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149. One of the plaintiff's grounds for recovery was that a 
handgun is an abnormally dangerous product such that manufacturers and market-
ers should be strictly liable under section 402A. The court rejected this argument 
because consumers ordinarily would expect a handgun to be dangerous because "its 
normal function is to propel bullets with deadly forpe." Id. at 136, 497 A.2d at 
1148. The court noted that a handgun used in criminal activity is not "defective" in 
the sense that its design or construction is lacking in some way, and that in pursuing 
a strict product liability claim, the plaintiff "confuse[ d) a product's norma/function, 
which very well may be dangerous, with a defect in a product's design or construc-
tion." /d. Had the gun misfired, exploded, or otherwise malfunctioned, presumably 
it would have been considered "defective" under section 402A. /d. 
168. /d. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147. The formulation of the abnormally dangerous activity 
theory on which the plaintiff relied is contained in §§ 519 and 520 of the REST ATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977). Section 519 provides that: 
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to lia-
bility for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the 
activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm; 
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of 
which makes the activity abnormally dangerous. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 519 (1977). 
Section 520 provides: 
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following 
factors are to be considered: 
·(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, 
land or chattels of others; 
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In Kelley, the court of appeals ruled that manufacturers and market-
ers of small, inexpensive handguns regularly used in criminal activity, 
sometimes referred to as "Saturday Night Specials," may be held 
"strictly liable to innocent persons who suffer gunshot injuries from the 
criminal use of their products." 169 Relying upon public policy, the court 
found that such handguns have virtually no legitimate uses and that the 
manufacturer or marketer of a Saturday Night Special "knows or ought 
to know that the chief use of the product is for criminal activity." 170 
Application of the new cause of action could prove difficult. Although 
the potential class of plaintiffs is broad enough to include almost anyone 
injured intentionally or otherwise by a Saturday Night Special, it is not 
clear when a weapon may be classified properly as a Saturday Night Spe-
cial. As the court conceded, "[t]here is no clear-cut, established defini-
tion of a Saturday Night Special .... "171 
In extending strict liability to the manufacturers of nondefective 
products, the court of appeals focused on the manufacturer's knowledge 
that the product would be used for crime and relied upon a case where 
the manufacturers of slingshots knew that children would purchase and 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried 
on; and · 
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its 
dangerous attributes. 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 520 (1977). 
The court of appeals rejected this approach because the "thrust of the doctrine 
is that the activity be abnormally dangerous in relation to the area in which it oc-
curs." Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 133, 497 A.2d 1143, 1147 (1985). An 
example of an abnormally dangerous activity, the court stated, is the storage of 
gasoline in faulty storage tanks near a water supply. Such storage constitutes a 
dangerous activity, in which "the hazard bears a relation to the occupation and 
location of the land on which the activity occurs." !d. The court found that the 
dangers of a handgun used in a crime were different because the dangers "bear no 
relation to any occupation or ownership of land." !d. 
169. Kelley, 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159. 
170. ld. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158. 
171. Id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159. Nevertheless, there are certain characteristics of a 
Saturday Nigh~ Special: 
Relevant factors include the gun's barrel length, concealability, cost, 
quality of materials, quality of manufacture, accuracy, reliability, whether 
it has been banned from import by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms, and other related characteristics. Additionally, the industry 
standards, and the understanding among law enforcement personnel, legis-
lators and the public, at the time the weapon was manufactured and/or 
marketed ... must be considered. Because many of these factors are rela-
tive, in a tort suit a handgun should rarely, if ever, be deemed a Saturday 
Night Special as a matter of law. Instead, it is a finding to be made by the 
trier of facts. 
!d. at 157-58, 497 A.2d at 1159-60. 
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"misuse" the product. 172 Whether manufacturer exploitation of such 
"foreseeable misuse" is a budding element, or an independent basis for 
strict liability in the products field, remains to be seen. 
Criticism of the Kelley opinion came quickly and centered on three 
areas: (1) the court functioned in a legislative rather than judicial capac-
ity; (2) the court decided an issue not before it; and (3) the court violated 
traditional jurisprudential standards. 173 As stated by two critics of Kel-
ley, "Although the opinion was clearly intended by its drafters to apply 
to the perceived evil of a limited class of firearms ... its dissonant reason-
ing could be applied to any product."174 Proponents of the opinion were 
equally adamant in their support of the decision. One writer commended 
the court for taking action in an area of law which the legislature had 
"neglected," adding that the opinion "does not constitute improper judi-
cial activism." 175 The legislative reaction has been mixed and an initial 
effort to overturn the Kelley opinion failed in the 1986 session of the 
Maryland General Assembly.176 
The Kelley opinion is simply a statement of public policy by the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 177 Read narrowly, the scope of the opin-
ion applies only to Saturday Night Specials. Read broadly, Kelley ex-
pands strict liability to manufacturers of products that are not in any way 
defective. In this latter regard, the Kelley opinion may open the door for 
the imposition of strict liability to other nondefective products where a 
plausible public policy argument could be fashioned to justify such liabil-
ity. Sawed-off shotguns and switchblade knives could logically fall 
within the ambit of Kelley-type liability. Thus, Kelley sets a disconcerting 
precedent for future expansion of manufacturer liability. 
B. Alternative Liability 
Regardless of the cause of action, under Maryland law one seeking 
172. ld. at 56, 497 A.2d at 1159. The case upon which the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land relied was Moning v. Alfano, 400 Mich. 425, 154 N.W.2d 759 (1977). 
173. See Dorr & Burch, Saturday Night Fever, THE BRIEF, Winter 1986, at 10. 
174. ld. at 15. 
175. Note, Saturday Night Specials: A "Special" Exception in Strict Liability Law, 61 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 478, 493 (1986). 
176. Senate Bill 151 and House Bill 1595 each would have had the result, if passed, of 
overturning the decision of the court of appeals in Kelley. S. 151 (1986); H.R. 1595 
(1986). Neither bill survived the 1986 legislative session. See Library and Com-
puter Div. of the Md. Dept. of Legislative Reference, Final Status Report for the 
1986 Session and the October 1985 Special Session of the General Assembly of Mary-
land, 46, 140 (1986). A similar bill failed in the 1987 legislative session. 
177. The basis of the Kelley opinion is that although no traditional cause of action exists 
for imposing liability on gun manufacturers, the common law is dynamic and the 
court is free to conform the law to contemporary conditions. Additionally, the im-
position of strict liability to handguns is consistent with state and federal gun con-
trol legislation. As the court observed, "the policy implications of the gun control 
laws ... reflects a governmental view that there is a handgun species, i.e., the so-
called Saturday Night Special, which is considered to have little or no legitimate 
purpose in today's society." Kelley, 304 Md. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158. 
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recovery must prove that a defect exists, attribute that defect to a seller, 
and establish a causal connection between the injury and the defect. 178 If 
a manufacturer's product is not a cause-in-fact of one's harm, recovery 
will be denied. 179 Recently, litigation involving entire industries has 
forced courts to reexamine this traditional approach. Asbestos, generic 
or fungible products with the same or similar formulas, and toxic chemi-
cals whose side effects have latent incubation periods are examples of 
products that present difficult problems of manufacturer identification. 
Some courts have addressed this problem by creating nontraditional the-
ories of liability. 
One such nontraditional theory is "alternative liability." Summers 
v. Tice provides a framework for the alternative liability theory. 180 In 
Summers, two hunters negligently fired their guns in the direction of the 
plaintiff. Although the plaintiff could prove negligence, he could not 
prove which hunter fired the shotgun pellets that hit him. Analogizing 
the situation to one in which an unconscious patient is injured on the 
operating table and cannot prove who injured him, 181 the Supreme Court 
of California reasoned that public policy must favor a plaintiff in such a 
case and created a new theory of liability which shifts the burden of proof 
on the issue of causation to the defendants. 182 The burden of proof is 
shifted to the defendants only if two conditions are satisfied: (1) the 
plaintiff must identify all of the parties whose negligence may have 
caused the injury; 183 and (2) the plaintiff must be incapable of proving 
which one of the defendants injured him, and not merely be unwilling to 
do so. 184 
The theory of alternative liability is flawed in that it presupposes 
that a plaintiff is able to identify all parties who may have been negligent 
and bring them before the court. 185 It may be impossible, however, to 
178. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1976); Jen-
sen v. American Motors Corp., 50 Md. App. 226, 234, 437 A.2d 242, 247 (1981). 
179. Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986). In 
Lohrmann, the court held that the plaintiff could recover from various defendant 
manufacturers of asbestos insulating materials only by proving that each manufac-
turer's product was a cause-in-fact of his disease. In this regard, the court noted 
that: 
As asbestosis litigation has developed over the past decade, most plaintiffs 
sue every known manufacturer of asbestos products, and during the course 
of discovery some of the defendants are dismissed on motions for sum-
mary judgment because there has been no evidence of any contact with 
any of such defendants' asbestos-containing products. 
ld. at 1162. See also Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978) 
("It is a fundamental principle of products liability law that a plaintiff must prove, 
as an essential element of his case, that a defendant manufacturer actually made the 
particular product which caused injury."). 
180. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). 
181. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). 
182. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948). 
183. !d. at 85-86, 199 P.2d at 3-4. 
184. !d. . 
185. The court's decision in Summers is based on a situation in which all defendants were 
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join all potential defendants as litigants. Injuries caused by drugs, chemi-
cals, and other products to which the doctrine might apply frequently are 
manifested long after purchase and use. Perhaps for this reason the doc-
trine of alternative liability has not been accepted in Maryland and other 
jurisdictions.186 
C Concert of Action 
The concert of action theory of liability is premised on the belief 
that unreasonably dangerous group activity should be deterred by hold-
ing jointly and severally liable all who participate in that dangerous ac-
tivity, even though only one participant actually caused the harm. 187 
This theory is applied most often to drag racing on public roads, where 
the participants may be described as "wrongdoers acting in concert."188 
before the court. As the Summers court explained, the shotgun pellets that injured 
the plaintiff could only have come from the gun of one or the other of the two 
defendants. Id. at 84, 199 P.2d at 3. 
186. The doctrine has been rejected in California, Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 
607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (drug manufacturers could not be liable under 
alternative liability theory), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Florida, Morton v. 
Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (alternative liability theory not 
available because plaintiff could not prove defendants caused injury); and Georgia, 
Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (alternative 
liability theory has no basis in Georgia law). Only Michigan has applied the doc-
trine. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164 (1984) (alterna-
tive liability theory should be applied if plaintiffs meet all requirements). South 
Carolina has indicated that it might apply the doctrine under the proper facts. See 
Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D. S.C. 1981) (where plaintiff named 
only 7 of 118 drug manufacturers, the manufacturers could not be liable under alter-
native liability theory). New Jersey applied alternative liability in Ferrigno v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980) (where plaintiffs were un-
able to identify which defendants manufactured synthetic estrogen ingested by their 
mothers, it was appropriate to shift burden of proof from inculpator to exculpator). 
New Jersey's adoption of alternative liability was cast in doubt by the subsequent 
case ofNamm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19,427 A.2d 1121 (1981) 
(theory of alternative liability would not be adopted in products liability action 
brought against some, but not all, manufacturers of pharmaceutical DES by plain-
tiffs whose mothers had taken DES while pregnant, because the imposition of such 
liability would abandon altogether traditional concepts and basic principles). 
187. The basic formulation of the theory is contained in section 876 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, which provides: 
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of 
another, one is subject to liability if he 
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a 
common design with him, or 
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and 
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to 
conduct himself, or 
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tor-
tious result and his own conduct, separately considered, consti-
tutes a breach of duty to the third person. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 876 (1977). 
188. Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1968). In Bierczynski, the Supreme 
Court of Delaware upheld a verdict in favor of two motorists who were injured by 
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Under the concert of action theory, participants in the act may be held 
jointly liable even if a particular participant can show that someone else 
caused the victim's injuries. Unlike alternative liability, the concert of 
action theory does not shift the burden of proof on the issue of causation 
to the defendants; rather, it allows liability against all parties involved in 
the activity once causation has been proved. 
In Cousineau v. Ford Motor Co., 189 the Court of Appeals of Michi-
gan reversed the trial court's dismissal of a plaintiff's concert of action 
claim against several manufacturers of wheels. 190 The plaintiff sustained 
her burden by proving, with adequate documentary evidence, that the 
various defendants tortiously carried out a common plan by failing to 
warn that the mismatching of wheel components was dangerous and by 
alleging that the defendants knew of the danger their products posed. 191 
Further, the plaintiff showed that the defendants chose to issue charts 
depicting which components were safely interchangeable rather than 
change the design of the components. The court found that "[t]his con-
duct ... could indicate a tacit understanding and mutual encouragement 
to refrain from taking more reasonable steps to prevent the danger posed 
by the multi-piece wheel rims." 192 Cousineau demonstrates that a con-
cert of action claim requires proof of an agreement or, at the very least, a 
tacit understanding among the defendants. 193 Whether the evidence in 
Cousineau would sustain a judgment against the defendants was not re-
solved, but the allegations were sufficient to deny a motion for summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants. 194 
A fundamental problem with the concert of action theory is that it 
may be applied where the actual wrongdoer is known to the plaintiff, but 
where the plaintiff wishes to include other defendants with greater re-
sources to pay damages. Where a plaintiff can show some tacit under-
standing among the members of an industry, he can include in his 
complaint more solvent members even though a less solvent member was 
the actual wrongdoer. This ability to reach a less culpable defendant has 
led many courts to reject the concert of action theory in product liability 
one of two teenagers drag racing on a public highway. The teenager not directly 
involved in the accident challenged the verdict for the plaintiff on the basis that he 
was not directly involved in the accident. The court disagreed, and held that "as a 
general rule, participation in a motor vehicle race on a public highway is an act of 
concurrent negligence imposing liability on each participant for any injury to a non-
participant resulting from the race." ld. See also Ogle v. Avina, 33 Wis. 2d 125, 
146 N.W.2d 422 (1966); Agovino v. Kunze, 181 Cal. App. 2d 591, 5 Cal. Rptr. 534 
(1960). 
189. 140 Mich. App. 19, 363 N.W.2d 721 (1985). 
190. Cousineau v. Ford Motor Co., 140 Mich. App. 19, 38, 363 N.W.2d 721, 731 (1985). 
191. Jd. at 33-34, 363 N.W.2d at 729. 
192. Id. at 34, 363 N.W.2d at 729. 
193. Id. at 32, 363 N.W.2d at 728. See also Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 
184, 342 N.W.2d 37, 46 (1984) (the "substantial amount" of parallel action by the 
defendants in the manufacture and marketing of DES failed to rise to the level of 
acting in concert). 
194. Cousineau, 140 Mich. App. at 35, 363 N.W.2d at 729. 
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cases. 195 
D. Enterprise Liability 
Industry-wide or enterprise liability may be imposed against the 
members of an entire industry if the industry-wide standard is the cause 
of the injuries. The origins of enterprise liability may be found in Hall v. 
E.l DuPont de Nemours & Co., 196 a case that involved a series of acci-
dents caused by defective blasting caps. In Hall, a federal district court 
invented a rule to resolve the problem that arises when a plaintiff is in-
jured by a generic product which cannot be traced to a specific manufac-
turer. The plaintiff in Hall requested that various defendants be held 
jointly and severally liable because they consciously agreed to provide 
inadequate safety warnings. 197 The court held that the plaintiffs stated a 
cause of action because they would be able to show some type of agree-
ment, whether express or tacit, among all the defendants. The court also 
decided that the plaintiffs could shift the burden of proof on the causa-
tion issue merely by demonstrating that the defendants independently 
adhered to industry-wide standards governing the features of the product 
alleged to be inadequate. I9s 
The scope of enterprise liability remains largely undefined. Accord-
ing to Hall, the doctrine generally should be applied to centralized, and 
not decentralized, industries. 199 To date, enterprise liability has not been 
accepted as a viable theory by any other court. 200 The most significant 
contribution of enterprise liability was in setting the stage for "market 
share liability." 
195. See, e.g.,.Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (court refused 
to find drug manufacturers liable under the concert of action theory because the 
manufacturers' activities failed to suggest any concerted tortious activity); Ryan v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.S.C. 1981) (drug manufacturers could not 
be held liable under concert of action theory because plaintiff could not prove a 
common plan among manufacturers); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 
P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (drug manufacturer could not be held liable under 
concert of action theory), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). 
196. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
1.97. Hall v. E.l. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
198. Id. at 374. 
199. Id. at 378. The same court that decided Hall recently suggested that enterprise 
liability might apply in "Agent Orange" cases where there was only a handful of 
producers of a chemical defoliant because the defendants failed to warn of the prod-
uct's dangers while profiting from the sale. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Li-
tig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 821-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
200. See Note, Market Share Liability: Is California a Mere Gadfly on the Products Lia-
bility Scene or Is It a Harbinger of a National Trend?, 11 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 129, 
143 (1984). Enterprise liability was rejected in Cousineau v. Ford Motor Co., 140 
Mich. App. 19, 363 N.W.2d 721 (1985); Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. 
Super. 19; 427 A.2d 1121 (1981); Ryan, 514 F. Supp. 1004; Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 
607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132. 
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E. Market Share Liability 
No decision has gone further in erasing the traditional boundaries of 
liability than the opinion of the Supreme Court of California in Sindell v. 
Abbott Laboratories.201 The plaintiffs in Sindell were the daughters of 
women who took the miscarriage preventative drug diethylstil bestrol 
(DES) while the plaintiffs were still in utero.202 The Sindell plaintiffs, 
and other women exposed to DES, later developed cancerous and pre-
cancerous conditions that did not manifest until after a minimum latency 
period of ten to twelve years. By the time the drug's effects were known, 
the plaintiffs were unable to identify the manufacturers of the DES their 
mothers had taken. 203 The court framed the issue as follows: "May a 
plaintiff, injured as a result of a drug administered to her mother during 
pregnancy, who knows the type of drug involved but cannot identify the 
manufacturer of the precise product, hold liable for her injuries a maker 
of a drug produced from a similar formula?"204 
The court answered the question affirmatively, with one important 
condition; the plaintiff must name as defendants a "substantial share" of 
those manufacturers known to have produced the defective product. In 
Sindell, for the first time, liability was based on the concept of punishing 
wrongful conduct regardless of whether the wrongful conduct of a given 
defendant actually caused the injuries of the plaintiffs. 205 In arriving at 
this result, the court considered and refused to apply the Summers alter-
native liability theory, the concert of action theory, or the enterprise lia-
bility theory. 206 The court rejected those theories and created "market 
share liability" because the existing theories would allow one defendant 
to be held liable for the damages caused by an entire industry even when 
that defendant played a small role, if any, in causing the harm.207 
Market share liability, as articulated in Sindell, combines the alter-
native liability theory for the purpose of establishing liability and the en-
201. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 12 (1980). 
202. Sindell v. Abbott Labs, at 593-94, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. 
203. /d. at 593-94, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34. 
204. Id. at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. 
205. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. 
206. /d. at 599-610, 607 P.2d at 928-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136-43. Regarding the Sum-
mers alternative liability theory, the court stated that, "[t]here may be a substantial 
likelihood that none of the five defendants joined in the action made the DES which 
caused the injury, and that the offending producer not named would escape liability 
altogether." /d. at 603, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. As to the concert of 
action claim, the court explained that the defendants did little more than follow the 
"common practice of an industry." Imposing liability under concert of action 
"would expand the doctrine far beyond its intended scope and would render virtu-
ally any manufacturer liable for the defective products of an entire industry, even if 
it could be demonstrated that the product which caused the injury was not made by 
the defendant." /d. at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141. Enterprise liabil-
ity was rejected for similar reasons. In addition, it was rejected due to its unsuitabil-
ity for an industry composed of a large number of manufacturers. /d. at 609-10, 607 
P.2d at 934-39, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 142-43. 
207. /d. 
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terprise liability theory for the purpose of apportioning damages. The 
Sindell court held that where one joins as defendants the manufacturers 
of a substantial share of a particular market, the burden then shifts to 
each manufacturer to establish that it could not have produced the prod-
uct. 208 The court then apportions damages among those manufacturers 
unable to show they could not have produced the product by multiplying 
each defendant's share of the market by the amount awarded to the in-
jured party.209 Through this formula, the court hoped to avoid a situa-
tion in which some manufacturers would be compelled to pay a 
disproportionately large share of damages.210 
In the wake of Sindell, two problems are apparent. First, it is un-
clear what constitutes a substantial share of the market. In Sindell, there 
was an assertion that the defendants controlled ninety percent of the 
market.211 The court referred to a Note in the Fordham Law Review212 
suggesting that seventy-five to eighty percent constituted a substantial 
share of the market.213 The court rejected this percentage requirement 
without recommending some other minimum level,214 but maintained 
that a substantial percentage of the market share is required. 
Second, it also is unclear whether one should define a market in 
terms of geography or in terms of a certain period of time. The Sindell 
court dismissed these problems as "largely matters of proof which prop-
erly cannot be determined at the pleading stage of these proceedings."215 
Perhaps for the same reason, the court did not indicate whether a plain-
tiff who sues only ninety percent of the market would be entitled to re-
cover only ninety percent of her damages .. 
Some courts have rejected the Sindell market share approach in 
favor of a modified market share approach because Sindell imposes on 
the plaintiff the practical difficulty of identifying a substantial share of 
the market participants and of proving the proportionate market share of 
each participant.216 Under the modified market share approach, the de-
fendant may proceed against a single defendant known to have produced 
the defective product or one similar to it. The burden then shifts to the 
defendant to identify and join as defendants other manufacturers en-
gaged in producing and distributing that product at the time of the plain-
tiff's injury.217 Market share liability was created specifically for a unique 
208. /d. at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-46. 
209. /d. 
210. /d. 
211. /d. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. 
212. Note, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 963 
(1978). 
213. /d. at 996. 
214. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. 
215. /d. at 613 n.29, 607 P.2d at 938 n.29, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 n.29. 
216. Martin v. Abbott Labs., 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984). 
217. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin explained why the burden of identifying market 
participants should rest with the named defendant rather than with the plaintiff: 
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species of cases involving DES.218 Courts undoubtedly will look to this 
theory in the future as other similar products are alleged to have caused 
latent injuries. 
Some states have refused to recognize market share liability.219 
Others have accepted either the Sinde/1 approach220 or the modified ap-
proach.221 Maryland appellate courts have not discussed any form of 
market share liability. Thus, it is yet to be determined whether Mary-
land, when faced with Sinde/1 type facts, would apply market share liabil-
ity in either its strict or modified form. 
IV. ESTABLISHED DEFENSES 
The development of defenses in a product liability action has been 
less dramatic than the emergence of new theories of liability. Tradition-
ally, the defenses of misuse, alteration of product, contributory negli-
gence, and assumption of risk were the only defenses available in product 
liability actions.222 Recently, defenses based on the conduct of the in-
jured party or other third parties have evolved. These defenses include 
[T]he defendant is in a better position than the plaintiff to determine which 
other drug companies may share liability. We recognize that many drug 
companies do not have the relevant records, but they, as participants in 
the DES market, presumably have more information or potential access to 
relevant information than does the plaintiff. 
Collins, 116 Wis. 2d 166, 193, 342 N.W.2d 37, SO. For this reason, the plaintiff need 
only file suit against a single defendant. As stated by the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington in Martin, 102 Wash. 2d S81, 689 P.2d 368, the plaintiff need only allege, 
[T]hat the plaintiff's mother took DES; that DES caused the plaintiff's 
subsequent injuries; that the defendant produced or marketed the type of 
DES taken by the plaintiff's mother; and that the defendant's conduct in 
producing or marketing the DES constituted a breach of a legally recog-
nized duty to the plaintiff. 
/d. at S94, 689 P.2d at 382 (quoting Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 193-94, 342 N.W.2d at 
SO). 
218. Along with Sindell, other courts have imposed market share liability in DES cases. 
See, e.g., McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., S64 F. Supp. 26S, 270 (C.D. S.D. 1983); 
Mertan v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 141 Cal. App. 3d S11, 190 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1983); 
Miles Labs. v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 587, 184 Cal. Rptr. 98, 103 (1982). 
219. See Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (in 
asbestosis case, market share liability is not recognizable under Georgia law); Mor-
ton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (eight of 149 manufacturers 
of DES could not be held liable under Florida law under either the concert of action 
theory or under the market share liability theory); Tidier v. Eli Lilly & Co., 95 
F.R.D. 332 (D. D.C. 1982) (the District of Columbia refused to recognize market 
share liability in a DES case); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 
1981) (South Carolina refused to recognize market share liability in a DES case); 
Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981) (New 
Jersey refused to adopt market share liability because adoption of that liability 
would result in extensive policy change). 
220. See supra note 218 .. 
221. See Collins, 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37; Martin, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 
368. 
222. The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 
337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976) observed: 
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the sophisticated user defense and the informed intermediary defense. 
Both represent a refined understanding of the causes of injury. The es-
tablished theories of defense, however, are still prominent in product lia-
bility litigation. 
A. Assumption of Risk 
The premise underlying the assumption of risk defense is that an 
injured party should not recover if he discovers a defect in a product, is 
aware of the danger, and uses the product nonetheless. 223 This defense 
may be employed regardless of the plaintiff's theory of recovery. 224 In 
Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 225 the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
expressly recognized assumption of risk as an affirmative defense in a 
product liability case. 226 The court noted that a defendant relying on 
assumption of risk must prove: (1) the plaintiff actually knew and appre-
ciated the particular risk or danger created by the defect; (2) the plaintiff 
Under § 402A, various defenses are still available to the seller in an 
action based on strict liability in tort. These defenses are set forth and 
explained in the official comments following § 402A. For example, the 
seller is not liable where injury results from abnormal handling or use of 
the product (Comment h), where mishandling or alteration after delivery 
of the product renders it unsafe (Comment g), or if warnings or instruc-
tions supplied with the product are disregarded by the consumer where, if 
used in accordance with these warnings, the product would be safe (Com-
ment j). Additionally, where the plaintiff unreasonably proceeds to use a 
product despite a known risk or danger, the defense of assumption of the 
risk is still available (Comment n). 
/d. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959-60. It is unclear whether the court of appeals intended 
to adopt the defenses or whether the court was merely discussing the impact of the 
defenses. Since Phipps, the court of appeals has dealt with several defenses: assump-
tion of the risk, in Ellsworth v. Sheme Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 
(1985) and Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983); misuse, 
in Ellsworth, 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348; and contributory negligence, which gener-
ally is not a defense in a strict liability claim, in Anthony Pools, 295 Md. 285, 455 
A.2d 434. 
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 402A comment n (1965) provides: 
[T]he form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily 
and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and com-
monly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this 
Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discov-
ers the defect and is aware of the danger and nevertheless proceeds unrea-
sonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from 
recovery. 
See also Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 597, 495 A.2d at 356. 
224. In Maryland, assumption of the risk always has been a defense in all tort cases, 
although the standard is less demanding in negligence than in strict liability. Under 
a negligence standard, the defendant does not have to show that the plaintiff acted 
unreasonably in encountering the risk. See Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 262 A.2d 
549 (1970); Erdman v. Johnson Bros., 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744 (1970). Erdman 
predated Maryland's adoption of strict liability in tort, but the facts of Erdman lend 
themselves to that cause of action. Although Erdman primarily discusses the de-
fense of contributory negligence, the analysis is appropriate for assumption of risk. 
225. 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985). 
226. /d. at 597, 495 A.2d at 356. 
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voluntarily encountered the risk while realizing the danger; and (3) the 
plaintiff's decision to encounter the known risk was unreasonable. 227 
Although the assumption of risk defense has been recognized, no Mary-
land appellate court has had the opportunity to discuss the elements of 
the defense as applied to product liability law. 
As a defense against a strict liability claim, assumption of risk re-
quires a demonstration that the plaintiff knew the product was defective. 
Mere failure to discover the defect is an insufficient basis for assertion of 
the defense. Such an allegation interjects into the assumption of risk de-
fense traditional notions of contributory negligence, which generally is 
not a defense to an action based on strict liability in tort. 228 
Beyond showing that the plaintiff knew of the defect involved, the 
majority of courts require that the defendant prove that the plaintiff fully 
understood the danger of the product.229 Some courts have held that 
proof of the assumption of risk defense may be by proof that the plaintiff 
either knew or should have known of the particular danger.230 Most 
courts, however, require the defendant to meet the heavier burden of 
showing that the plaintiff had actual or subjective knowledge of the dan-
ger.231 Maryland applies a subjective test to gauge the plaintiff's knowl-
edge of the danger.232 Under this approach, courts consider the 
plaintiff's knowledge, understanding, and appreciation of the danger, 
rather than the mythical "reasonably prudent person" employed in con-
tributory negligence cases. The plaintiff's subjective state of mind also 
may be inferred from extrinsic circumstances.233 
The second element of the assumption of risk defense is that the 
227. Id. at 597, 495 A.2d at 356. 
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965) ("Contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a 
failure to discover a defect in a product, or to guard against the possibility of its 
existence."). 
229. See, e.g., Christner v. E.W. Bliss Co., 524 F. Supp. 1122 (M.D. Pa. 1981); Rhoads v. 
Serv. Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Culp v. Reynord and Booth-
Rouse Equip. Co., 38 Colo. App. 1, 553 P.2d 844 (1976); Wilson v. Norfolk & W. 
Ry. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 79, 440 N.E.2d 238 (1982); Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 
288 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1980); Harris v. Atlanta Stove Works, 428 So. 2d 1040 (La. 
App.), cert. denied, 434 So. 2d 1106 (La. 1983); Kuiper v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., 673 P.2d 1208 (Mont. 1983); Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 176 Mont. 98, 576 
P.2d 711, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Zaharte v. Strurm, Ruger & Co., 661 P.2d 
17 (Mont. 1983); Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Serv., 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 
1984); Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977); Smith v. Smith, 
278 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1979); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 
1973); Klein v. R.D. Werner Co., 98 Wash. 2d 316, 654 P.2d 94 (1982). 
230. See Ganji v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 81, 360 A.2d 907 (1976) (a 
defendant must prove that a plaintiff had, or ought to have had, knowledge and 
comprehension of the particular peril to which he was exposed and that he then 
continued to expose himself to it). 
231. See infra note 239. · 
232. Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, SO Md. App. 614, 625-26 nn.10, 11, 440 A.2d 1085, 
1091-92 nn.to; 11 (1982), aff'd, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983). 
233. Id. 
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plaintiff voluntarily encountered the risk while realizing the danger.234 
Typically, the issue of the plaintiff's voluntariness arises in two situa-
tions. In the first, the plaintiff argues that his contact with the hazardous 
condition was inadvertent. The distinction between inadvertent and in-
tentional contact was considered by the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland in Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp. 235 In Banks, an employee in-
jured his hand in a conveyor belt. It was unclear whether the employee 
intentionally placed his hand in an area which he knew to be dangerous, 
or whether he tripped and inadvertently came into contact with the con-
veyor belt. This uncertainty caused the court to conclude that whether 
the defendant voluntarily accepted the risk as to allow the assumption of 
risk defense was a question for the jury.236 In support of this position, 
the court quoted Kessler v. Bowie Machine Works:237 
To support an assumption of risk defense ... it is well 
established that the defendant must show that an employee not 
only had knowledge of the existence of the risk and an appreci-
ation of its character but also that he voluntarily accepted this 
risk, i.e., that he had a sufficient amount of time and enough 
knowledge and experience to make an intelligent choice.238 
The second situation in which the voluntariness question arises is 
when an employee recognizes a danger and complains to his employer, 
who then either forces the employee to continue working and the em-
ployee is injured, or instructs the employee to stop working, but the em-
ployee ignores the instruction and is injured. In the first instance, the 
employee's action probably would not be considered voluntary, although 
one court found voluntariness in such a situation. 239 In the second in-
stance, the accident probably would be considered voluntary.240 
The third element of the assumption of risk defense is that the plain-
tiff's decision to encounter the known risk be unreasonable.241 By its 
very nature, this requirement generates issues to be resolved by the jury. 
The requirement contemplates a review by the fact finder to determine 
234. !d. at 626 n.ll, 440 A.2d at 1092 n.ll. 
235. 59 Md. App. 408, 475 A.2d 1243 (1984). 
236. Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 434, 475 A.2d 1243, 1256. 
237. 501 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1974). 
238. Kessler v. Bowie Mach. Works, 501 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1974). This general 
principle was applied in Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010 (lOth Cir. 1983) 
(evidence that user of roof bolter slipped or lost balance and instinctively grabbed 
bolter, severing four fingers, precluded finding that user voluntarily encountered 
risk). 
239. Fore v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 346, 349, 287 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1972) 
(mere fact that employee exposed himself to an abnormal risk because he feared he 
would Jose his job does not make employee's action involuntary). 
240. See Haines v. Powermatic Houdailie, Inc., 661 F.2d 94, 96 (8th Cir. 1981); Colson 
v. Allied Prod. Corp., 640 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1981). 
241. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. at 626 n.ll, 440 A.2d at 1092 n.ll. 
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whether the plaintiff acted reasonably in light of all the facts and circum-
stances involved in the event that caused the injury. 
In Maryland, the plaintiff is barred from recovery once a defendant 
has established that the plaintiff assumed the risk, even if the plaintiff was 
only at fault to a small degree.242 The majority of jurisdictions have re-
jected this ali-or-nothing approach in favor of comparative fault princi-
ples, under which the liability is apportioned between the plaintiff and 
the defendant in proportion to their respective degrees offault.243 Under 
the comparative fault approach, the plaintiff's assumption of risk is but 
one factor considered in determining liability.244 Maryland has not yet 
adopted the comparative fault approach. 
B. Misuse 
A manufacturer is not liable under any theory if its product becomes 
dangerous as a result of "misuse." Generally, a manufacturer is under 
no duty to design safeguards for a product in anticipation of its mis-
use.245 In the strict liability context, comment h of section 402A estab-
lishes the widely followed basis for the misuse defense: 
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for 
normal handling and consumption. If the injury results from 
abnormal handling, as where a bottled beverage is knocked 
against a radiator to remove the cap, or from abnormal prepa-
ration for use, as where too much salt is added to food, or from 
abnormal consumption, as where a child eats too much candy 
and is made ill, the seller is not liable. 246 
The general rule is that a product is misused when it is not used in a 
manner which is reasonably foreseeable. 247 Jurisdictions are split, how-
242. Maryland has recognized the assumption of risk defense to a negligence claim. See 
Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 262 A.2d 579 (1970). 
243. See infra note 272 and accompanying text. See also Daly v. General Motors Corp., 
20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978) (court abolished assump-
tion of risk as a complete defense and adopted comparative fault). 
244. See Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 661 P.2d 17 (Mont. 1983); Trust Corp. of Mont. 
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981), aff'd, 701 F.2d 85 (9th 
Cir. 1983). 
245. See Westerman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 577 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1978); Latimer v. 
General Motors Corp., 535 F. Supp. 1020 (7th Cir. 1976). 
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A comment h (1965). 
247. Maryland adopted this standard in Ellsworth v. Sheme Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 
595-96, 495 A.2d 348, 355 (1985). A wide range of uses are held misuses because 
they are not reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., Kay v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 
1370, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1977) (failure to comply with airplane instruction manual); 
McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364, 370 (5th Cir. 1968) (installation of 
wrong size tires where plaintiff had been furnished with manufacturer's instructions 
regarding proper tire size); O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104, 1133 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (overloading airplane); McCormick v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 81 Ill. 
App. 3d 154, 162-63, 400 N.E.2d 1009, 1015-16 (1980) (use of counterweights on 
crane in excess of OSHA safety rules); Brandenburg v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 77 Ill. 
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ever, as to whether misuse is an affirmative defense, or whether it is an 
element of the plaintiff's claim. 248 In Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, 
Inc. , 249 the Court of Appeals of Mary land held that misuse is an element 
of the plaintiff's claim: 
Because defectiveness and causation are elements which must 
be proved by the plaintiff, we conclude that misuse is not an 
affirmative defense. Misuse, therefore, is a "defense" only in 
the sense that proof of misuse negates one or more essential 
elements of a plaintiff's case, and may thereby defeat 
recovery. 250 
Unlike some jurisdictions, Maryland has broadened the reasonably 
foreseeable standard for determining misuse by means of the "general 
field of danger" test.251 Under this test, a defendant asserting a misuse 
defense must go beyond showing that a specific use was not reasonably 
foreseeable. The defendant must show that "the general field of danger" 
was not reasonably foreseeable. In American Laundry Machine Indus-
tries v. Horan, 252 the plaintiff was able to recover for injuries sustained 
when an industrial dryer disintegrated, strewing schrapnel, after the 
plaintiff had attempted to dry a large hot air balloon in the machine.253 
Similarly, in LeBouefv. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,254 the court held 
that where a tire manufacturer failed to warn as to the safe speed for its 
tires and one of its tires blew out at a speed in excess of 100 m.p.h., 
plaintiff can recover for injury caused by that blowout.255 
App. 2d 374, 379, 222 N.E.2d 348, 350 (1966) (use of an automobile jack that the 
plaintiff knew was not suited for use on a particular make of vehicle). 
248. See Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 592-93, 495 A.2d 348, 355 
(1985). Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Nebraska, New Mexico, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Washington have held that 
misuse is an affirmative defense. Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, and 
North Dakota have held that the plaintiff has the burden of proving the absence of 
misuse as part of either or both of the issues of defectiveness and proximate cause. 
/d. at 593-94, 495 A.2d at 355-56. 
249. 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985). In Ellsworth, the plaintiff was injured when the 
nightgown she was wearing inside out with a pocket protruding brushed against a 
hot burner on an electric stove and caught fire. /d. at 588, 495 A.2d at 351. The 
plaintiff alleged that her injuries were the result of a failure to make the gown flame-
resistant and a failure to warn of the danger that the gown could catch fire. /d. at 
587, 495 A.2d at 351. The court found that it was entirely foreseeable to the manu-
facturer that the apparel would be worn inside out and close to sources of ignition. 
/d. at 598, 495 A.2d at 357. The court held that such use of the nightgown was not 
"misuse" which would preclude recovery. /d. at 598, 495 A.2d at 356. 
250. /d. at 597, 495 A.2d at 356. 
251. See Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 551, 332 A.2d 11, 19 (1975); American 
Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 104, 412 A.2d 407, 413 (1980). 
252. 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980). 
253. American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 100, 412 A.2d 407, 411 
(1980). 
254. 451 F. Supp. 253 (W.O. La. 1978), a.ff'd, 623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980). 
255. LeBouefv. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 451 F. Supp. 253, 257 (W.O. La. 1978), 
a.ff'd, 623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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In Ellsworth,256 the court of appeals held that assumption of risk 
was an affirmative defense but misuse was not. 257 The court also held 
that the related concept of contributory negligence is not a defense to 
strict liability in a products liability case.258 The court stated that the 
conduct that operates to defeat recovery may in fact be negligent, but the 
plaintiff is barred only because such conduct constitutes misuse or as-
sumption of risk, not because it constitutes contributory negligence. 259 
Contributory negligence is always a defense to a claim of negligence. 
For this reason, the court in Ellsworth declined to adopt a per se rule that 
the trial court must instruct the jury that contributory negligence is not a 
defense to strict liability. Nevertheless, when both negligence and strict 
liability are present, and the same conduct may conceivably constitute 
both contributory negligence and misuse, the court found an instruction 
that contributory negligence is inapplicable might be misleading. 260 The 
court left the issue to the discretion of the trial judge. 261 In jurisdictions 
that have replaced contributory negligence with comparative fault, mis-
use, like assumption of risk, is but one of many factors to be taken into 
consideration in apportioning the fault among the parties. Thus, misuse 
is not a complete defense in those jurisdictions, 262 as it is in Maryland. 
C. Alteration of Product 
Under certain circumstances, the alteration of a product after it 
leaves the seller's possession may render the product defective and unrea-
sonably dangerous. Under section 402A(l)(b) of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, one of the essential requirements for imposition of strict 
liability is that the product reach the user "without substantial change in 
the condition in which it is sold."263 If the product leaves the possession 
of the manufacturer, then undergoes a change that substantially alters 
the product, and the change proximately causes the plaintiff's injuries, 
the manufacturer may not be held liable.264 
Maryland's appellate courts have had few occasions to comment on 
the meaning of "substantial change." Recently, the court of spxial ap-
peals explained that, under section 402A(l )(b), "the focus . . . is on the 
adjective 'substantial'; not every change made to a product after it leaves 
the manufacturer suffices to preclude liability."265 Reviewing some of 
256. 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985). 
257. Id. at 597, 495 A.2d at 356. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. at 598, 495 A.2d at 356. 
260. Id. at 598-600, 495 A.2d at 357. 
261. Id. 
262. See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1303-04 (Utah 1981). 
263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A(l)(b) (1965). 
264. Where the subsequent alteration leading to the accident was forseeable by the seller, 
the seller may be held liable. See Webb v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 750 F.2d 368, 
372 (5th Cir. 1985). 
265. Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 432, 475 A.2d 1243, 1255 (1984). 
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the case law in this area, the court observed: "Some courts stress the 
foreseeability of the alteration; others speak simply to whether the 
change made an otherwise safe product unsafe; and others, borrowing 
from the law of negligence, view the matter as whether the alteration 
constituted a supervening cause."266 Regardless of which approach is 
used, the court noted that "the substantiality of the change is a question 
of fact, and if there is any conflict in the evidence, it is for the jury to 
determine. " 267 
A good example of the alteration of product defense at work is 
found in Seeborg v. General Motors Corp. In Seeborg, a fire destroyed a 
new vehicle after the vehicle's owner replaced a fuse on the vehicle with 
one that was "stronger" and "heavier" than the original.268 The owner 
made the change despite a warning in the owner's manual against using 
fuses with an amperage higher than specified. 269 The court held that be-
cause the plaintiff had misused the product there would be no liability 
against the manufacturer.270 
It is likely that foreseeability issues will arise in alteration cases. In 
some jurisdictions, the alteration of product defense is inapplicable if the -
particular alteration was "reasonably foreseeable."271 The application of 
such a reasonableness standard is not appropriate in a strict liability case, 
however, because it introduces the concept of negligence into a doctrine 
premised on liability without fault. Maryland has not determined 
whether a court should consider the foreseeability of an alteration in a 
strict liability case. 
D. Comparative Fault 
Comparative fault, also known as comparative negligence, delegates 
responsibility to each person based upon that person's degree of fault in 
causing injury to another person. 272 Several years ago, Maryland re-
jected an opportunity to adopt comparative fault judicially,273 and the 
legislature has not enacted a comparative fault statute. The argument in 
favor of adopting comparative fault, and the decision as to which of the 
various comparative fault schemes Maryland should adopt, has been dis-
266. /d. 
267. /d. at 433-34, 475 A.2d at 1255. In Banks, the purchaser of a conveyor belt modi-
fied its design. The court held that whether the modification in question was a 
substantial change was a question for the fact finder. /d. 
268. Seeborg v. General Motors Corp., 284 Or. 695, 697, 588 P.2d 1100, 1101-02 (1978). 
269. /d. at 698, 588 P.2d at 1102. 
270. /d. at 704, 588 P.2d at 1104-05. 
271. Webb v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 750 F.2d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 1985); Merriweather 
v. E. W. Bliss Co., 636 F.2d 42, 44-45 (3d Cir. 1980); Craven v. Niagara Mach. and 
Tool Works, 417 N.E.2d 1165, 1170-71 (Ind. App. 1981). 
272. For a thorough discussion of comparative fault and its wide acceptance in the 
United States, see V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 1984). 
273. Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 460-63, 456 A.2d 894, 
904-05 (1983). 
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cussed elsewhere.274 Nevertheless, one aspect of that decision deserves 
mention here. 
Application of comparative negligence principles to strict liability 
creates a doctrinal problem because the comparative fault approach in a 
strict product liability context would require that the product liability 
action be characterized as some type of negligence so that fault could be 
assessed. 275 Some courts have overcome this problem by characterizing 
strict liability in tort as the equivalent of negligence per se,276 but others 
have refused to do so.277 The doctrinal problem could be resolved easily 
by a statute which recognizes that comparative fault actually focuses on 
causation, not fault. Notwithstanding, comparative fault is more a fair 
allocation of resources than a defense because it recognizes that parties at 
fault should share the cost of damages in proportion to their 
contribution. 
V. EMERGING DEFENSES 
A pair of closely related defenses are emerging from cases involving 
claims of failure to warn. Known as the "sophisticated user" defense and 
the "informed intermediary" defense, these theories provide that one 
either has no duty to warn or is excused from that duty in certain cir-
cumstances. Along with the "state of the art" defense, these two doc-
trines interject elements of negligence into strict product liability. 
A. The Sophisticated User Defense 
A manufacturer or supplier has a duty to warn product users of 
dangers associated with the product only if the manufacturer has reason 
to anticipate that danger may result from a particular use.278 Where the 
274. Digges, Jr. and Klein, Comparative Fault in Maryland: The Time Has Come, 41 
Mo. L. REv. 276 (1982). 
275. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965) (the premise of 
strict product liability is that liability does not depend upon the negligence of the 
seller, but upon the condition of the product). See also Phipps v. General Motors 
Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1976). 
276. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin adopted this approach in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 
Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). The court explained that: 
if this same liability were imposed for violation of a statute, it is difficult to 
perceive why we could not consider it negligence per se for the purpose of 
applying the comparative negligence statute just as we have done so many 
times in other cases involving the so-called "safety statutes." 
Id. at 461-62, 155 N.W.2d at 64-65. Under this rationale, the court avoided the 
doctrinal problem through an attempt to compare the contributory negligence of the 
user of a product with the defendant's strict liability. Other courts have adopted the 
Dippel approach. See West v. Caterpillar, 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Busch v. Busch 
Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). 
277. The Supreme Court of Nevada has refused to apply comparative fault as a defense 
to a strict liability action. See Young's Mach. Co. v. Long, 692 P.2d 24 (Nev. 1984) 
(state's comparative negligence statute does not extend to a strict liability action; 
such an extension must be made by the legislature). 
278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402 comment h (1965). 
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manufacturer is aware that the danger posed by a particular product is 
clearly known to the purchaser-employer, then the manufacturer has no 
duty to warn the purchaser-employer or its employees.279 Rather, it is 
the responsibility of the purchaser-employer to protect employees against 
the particular danger either through adequate warnings or other precau-
tions. 280 In a negligent failure to warn claim, the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Virginia noted: "[W]hen the supplier 
has reason to believe that the purchaser of the product will recognize the 
dangers associated with the product, no warnings are mandated."281 
The sophisticated user defense is based on two premises: (1) pur-
chasers knowledgeable in a specific area know the risks associated with a 
certain product; and (2) the employer is better able to warn employees of 
the dangers than is the manufacturer.282 In the three-party setting, 
where manufacturer, purchaser, and employee are involved, the sophisti-
cated user defense is closely analagous to the doctrine of superseding-
intervening cause and to the informed intermediary doctrine. 283 In the 
two-party setting, where only manufacturer and purchaser are involved, 
the doctrine is similar to the patent danger rule. 284 
A good example of the successful application of the sophisticated 
user defense is found in the case of Goodbar v. Whitehead Brothers.285 
The plaintiffs in Goodbar worked in a foundry where they inhaled free-
floating silica dust. 286 They alleged that this exposure resulted in their 
contracting silicosis. The United States District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia relied on comment n of Section 388(a) of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts287 in concluding that, under Virginia law and the 
279. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 comment n (1965). 
280. See generally Comment, Duty To Warn and the Sophisticated User Defense in Prod-
ucts Liability Cases, 15 U. BALT. L. REv. 276 (1986). This comment traces the 
development of the sophisticated user defense from its creation in Littlehale v. E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours Co., 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), through its more 
recent applications. Particular attention is paid to use of the defense in cases involv-
ing asbestos. 
281. Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 561 (W.D. Va. 1984), aff'd sub 
nom. Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985). 
282. Id. at 561-62. 
283. See, e.g., Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 644 (4th Cir. 1981); Ster-
ling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966); Fellows v. USV Pharm. 
Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297,299 (D. Md. 1980); Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. 
Supp. 377, 381 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977). 
284. See Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 475 A.2d 1243 (1984). 
285. 591 F. Supp. 552 (W.O. Va. 1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985). 
286. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 555. 
287. Section 388 provides: 
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another 
to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to 
use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its 
probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the 
manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the 
supplier: 
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dan-
gerous for the use for which it is supplied; 
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Restatement, "there is no duty on product suppliers to warn employees 
of knowledgeable industrial purchasers as to product-related 
hazards. "288 
Goodbar was decided on the basis of negligent failure to warn as 
opposed to strict liability failure to warn. In interpreting Maryland law, 
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has 
indicated that there is no meaningful distinction between a failure to 
warn claim based on negligence and a failure to warn claim based on 
strict liability in tort. 289 A claim based on either theory still focuses on 
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is sup-
plied will realize its dangerous condition, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condi-
tion or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). The present text of§ 388 re-
mains unchanged from the original draft, which the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
adopted in Kaplan v. Stein, 198 Md. 414, 420, 84 A.2d 81, 84 (1951). 
288. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 559. The court outlines application of the defense: 
[A] sand supplier to a large, knowledgeable foundry like the Lynch-
burg Foundry has no duty to warn the Foundry employees about the oc-
cupational disease of silicosis and its causes when only the Foundry is in 
the position to communicate effective warning and accordingly should be 
the one to shoulder any burden of effective warning. The difficulties that 
the sand suppliers face in attempting to warn the Foundry's employees of 
the hazards inherent in the use of sand in a foundry setting are numerous. 
These include: 
(1) the identification of the users or those exposed to its products 
would require a constant monitoring by the suppliers in view of 
the constant turnover of the Foundry's large work force; 
(2) the manner in which the sand products are delivered in bulk (i.e. 
unpackaged railroad car lots or truck); 
(3) no written product warnings placed on the railroad cars would 
ever reach the workers involved in casting or those in the immedi-
ate vicinity due to the way the loose sand is unloaded, conveyed, 
and kept in storage bins until needed; 
(4) only the Foundry itself would be in the position to provide the 
good housekeeping measures, training and warnings to its work-
ers on a continuous and systematic basis necessary to reduce the 
risk of silicosis; 
(5) the sand suppliers must rely on the Foundry to convey any safety 
information to its employees; 
(6) the confusion arising when twelve different suppliers and the 
Foundry each try to cope with the awesome task of instructing 
the Foundry workers; and 
(7) in a commercial setting, it would be totally unrealistic to assume 
that the suppliers would be able to exert pressure on a large, in-
dustrial customer such as the Foundry to allow the suppliers to 
come in and educate its workers about the hazards of silicosis. 
ld. at 566. See also Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 718, 591 P.2d 478 
(1979); Schwartz & Driver, Warnings in the Work Place: The Need for A Synthesis 
of Law and Communication Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 38 (1983). 
289. In Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), the court, applying Mary-
land law, observed in the failure to warn context the close similarity between negli-
gence and strict liability: 
The elements of both are the same with the exception that in negligence 
plaintiff must show a breach of a duty of due care by defendant while in 
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the adequacy of the warning. 290 Thus, although the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has not stated that there is no difference between the duty to 
warn under strict liability or negligence, Fourth Circuit opinions suggest 
that this is the position the court of appeals would take given an 
opportunity. 
B. The "Informed Intermediary" Defense 
As with the sophisticated user defense, the informed intermediary 
doctrine requires that one discharge his duty to warn by advising a third 
party. Under the informed intermediary defense, a manufacturer has no 
duty to warn patient-consumers about the dangers of prescription drugs; 
that duty lies with the prescribing physician. One commentator enumer-
ated the reasons for this exception: 
(1) The doctor is intended to be an intervening party in the full 
sense of the word. Medical ethics as well as medical practice 
dictate independent judgment, unaffected by the manufac-
turer's control, on the part of the doctor. (2) Were the patient 
to be given the complete and highly technical information on 
the adverse possibility associated with the use of the drug, he 
would have no way to evaluate it, and in his limited under-
standing he might actually object to the use of the drug, 
thereby jeopardizing his life. (3) It would be virtually impossi-
ble for a manufacturer to comply with the duty of direct warn-
ing, as there is no sure way to reach the patient.29 1 
No Maryland appellate court to date has recognized the defense, yet 
the defense has been applied and discussed by the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland, applying Maryland law, in Fellows v. 
USV Pharmaceutical Corp. 292 In Fellows, the court stated that "[i]n the 
strict liability plaintiff must show the product was unreasonably danger-
ous. The distinction between the two lessens considerably in failure to 
warn cases since it is clear that strict liability adds little in warning cases. 
Under a negligence theory the issue is whether the defendant exercised due 
care in formulating and updating the warning, while under a strict liability 
theory the issue is whether the lack of a proper warning made the product 
unreasonably dangerous. Though phrased differently the issue under 
either theory is essentially the same: was the warning adequate? 
/d. at 858. 
290. /d. It may be, however, that under Maryland law the requirements of duty to warn 
are the same in negligence and strict liability only when the defective product is a 
drug. See Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 381 (D. Md. 1975), 
aff'd 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977) ("[W)hile there may be a distinction between a 
negligent failure to warn and the warning requirements for strict liability insofar as 
other products are concerned, comment k [of section 402A] itself indicates that 
where new drugs, sold under the prescription of a physician, are involved, the stan-
dards are essentially the same."). 
291. Rheingold, Products Liability - The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 
RUTGERS L. REV. 947, 987 (1964) (citations omitted). 
292. 502 F. Supp. 297 (D. Md. 1980). 
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area of prescription drugs, as distinguished from those sold directly to 
the consumer, it is well established that the manufacturer's duty to warn 
is limited to advising the prescribing or treating physician of the drug's 
potential dangers."293 Thus, although Maryland courts have yet to ad-
dress the informed intermediary defense, it appears that the court of ap-
peals would adopt the rule under appropriate circumstances. 
C State of the Art 
Evidence of "state of the art" is actual demonstration of the level of 
scientific or technological knowledge at the time that a particular prod-
uct was manufactured. 294 What an industry knew and could do at a par-
ticular time is evidence of state of the art. What a particular industry did 
at a certain time, however, is evidence of state of the industry.295 
Although the two may concur, they are distinct considerations.296 
In either a design defect or a failure to warn case, evidence of state 
of the art is directly probative of the issue of whether a particular design 
presents an "inherently unreasonable" risk. 297 In McLaughlin v. Sikor-
sky Aircraft, 298 state of the art evidence was admitted in order to estab-
lish that the benefits of the challenged design outweighed the risk 
inherent in such design.299 In McLaughlin, the Court of Appeals of Cali-
fornia noted, "[a]mong the relevant factors, and peculiarly within the 
manufacturer's knowledge, are the feasibility and the cost of alternative 
designs."300 The court distinguished between an industry's capabilities 
and an industry's custom and found "evidence of industry custom and 
usage [to be] irrelevant in a products liability case."301 
293. Fellows v. USV Pharm. Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Md. 1980). 
294. See generally, Robb, A Practical Approach to Use of State of the Art Evidence in 
Strict Product Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1982); O'Donnell, Design 
Litigation and the State of the Art: Terminology, Practice and Reform, 11 AKRON L. 
REv. 627 (1978). 
295. Most jurisdictions employ the term "state of the art" to refer to that which is tech-
nologically or practically feasible. See Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Social Club, Inc., 390 
N.E.2d 1133, 1138 n.8 (Mass. App. 1979) (techologically feasible); McLaughlin v. 
Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983) (both technologically and practically feasible). 
296. Some courts have employed the term "state of the art" to mean the custom of a 
particular industry. Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 172, 
406 A.2d 140, 151 (1979); Olson v. A.W. Chesterson Co., 256 N.W.2d 530, 540 
(N.D. 1977). For a discussion of "state of the art" and "state of the industry" see 
Chown v. USM Corp., 297 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Iowa 1980). 
297. The evidence derives its relevance either from an allegation that the product is un-
reasonably dangerous and no alternative design was safer and practicable or, that 
the product was unreasonably dangerous because there was a safer, practicable de-
sign available, and that design's benefits outweighed any additional costs. The rele-
vance of the evidence under either theory is illustrated in United States v. Carroll 
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
298. 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764. 
299. /d. 
300. /d. at 209-10, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 767. 
301. /d. 
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Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has not yet addressed 
the issue of admissibility of evidence of state of the art, the arguments 
against admissibility will probably focus on the fact that strict liability 
does not involve the issue of care. Manufacturers probably will respond 
that state of the art evidence is relevant in determining whether the prod-
uct is defective or unreasonably dangerous. 302 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Law evolves as the legislative and judicial branches of government 
adopt new attitudes toward legal issues. In the field of product liability, 
it was originally difficult to hold manufacturers liable for injury caused 
by their products, even when those products proved to be defective by 
many recognized standards. The adoption of the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity accelerated the swing of the pendulum away from a kind of immunity 
from liability for manufacturers. The doctrine was adopted as a matter 
of public policy; it aimed at placing the cost of injury, at least in the first 
instance, on the parties responsible for placing the defective product into 
the stream of commerce. Evolution has expanded the doctrine to include 
essentially all parties associated with a product's marketing cycle. 
Notwithstanding the continuing development of strict liability, 
courts and legislatures also have expanded manufacturer liability 
through the development of new theories. The controversial "Saturday 
Night Special" opinion is a good example of this phenomenon. Similarly, 
alternative liability, concert of action, enterprise liability, and market 
share liability allow responsibility for liability to be assessed against man-
. ufacturers that are only remotely and indirectly responsible for the injury 
in question. 
The development of these new theories of liability undoubtedly re-
flects a compassionate concern by the courts for the fate of injured par-
ties. However, this steady expansion of manufacturer liability also places 
an increasing economic burden on society because risk spreading ulti-
mately will reside with consumers and society in general. Several new 
defenses have arisen attempting to offset the new theories of liability, but 
the net effect of the changes in product liability law in the past decade 
has been to shift a disturbing amount of responsibility onto product man-
ufacturers. Thus, it is an appropriate time to reverse the trend toward 
increased manufacturer liability. 
302. There is little doubt that state of the art evidence is admissible in negligence cases 
because negligence focuses on a manufacturer's conduct and compares that conduct 
to what a reasonable manufacturer in similar circumstances would have done. 
